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PRICE TRANSPARENCY AND INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS IN
HEALTH CARE
Wendy Netter Epstein
ABSTRACT
Market-based health reform solutions dominate the post-Affordable Care
Act landscape. Under these plans, competition is supposed to bring down
ballooning prices, and patients are to act more like consumers, refusing lowvalue, medically unnecessary care. Whether one embraces these solutions, one
thing is clear: they cannot work absent price transparency—which the U.S.
system lacks. To the contrary, the law explicitly enforces open price term
contracts between patients and providers.
This Article is the first to synthesize theories of incomplete contracts from
traditional law and economics and recent work in the behavioral sciences and
to apply these theories to the price transparency problem. It argues that
doctrine is out of step with theory, and proposes a contract law solution: an
information-forcing penalty default rule. Courts should impose an undesirable
default to force the parties to contract around the default. When providers fail
to include a price, and it would have been reasonable to do so, courts should
fill the gap with a price of $0. Rather than risk not being paid, providers will
include a price in the patient contract. Legislative action has been both slow
and ineffective in fixing the crucial price transparency problem. At no other
time in recent memory has the importance of contract theory been put into
such sharp relief and, remarkably, in an area of law that is at the very core of
the emerging political economy.
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INTRODUCTION
James, a sixty-five-year-old man, suffers from severe chest pain that is not
improving with medication or lifestyle changes. His cardiologist tells him that
he needs an angioplasty, a procedure in which a catheter widens a narrowed
artery. After discussing the risks of the procedure, James agrees. He arrives at
the hospital and signs a series of standard forms, one of which states that he
“individually obligates himself . . . to pay the account of the Hospital in
accordance with the regular rates and terms of the Hospital.”1 He receives no
information about the cost of the procedure, but by signing the form, he enters
into a contract to pay whatever the charges end up being.
James later receives the bill for the angioplasty—$67,937. With his $5,000
insurance policy deductible and 20% copay, his portion of the bill amounts to
$17,587. Ultimately, he must pay the out-of-pocket limit on his policy, $7,150
for 2017.2 Before receiving the bill, James had no idea how much the
procedure would cost. He also did not know that an angioplasty at another
hospital in the same city would have cost only $10,749—532% less. Had he
had the procedure at the other hospital, James would have owed $6,150—
$1,000 less than what he paid.3 Indeed, large price differentials despite similar
quality are common in the U.S. system.4
1

See Conditions of Admission, CEDARS-SINAI MED. CTR., https://www.cedars-sinai.edu/Patients/
Programs-and-Services/Pain-Center/Documents/PainCenterConditionsofAdmission-75446.pdf (last visited
Sept. 16, 2017).
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012); FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation (Part XXVII), CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (May 26, 2015), https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Fact-Sheets-andFAQs/Downloads/ACA-FAQs-Part-XXVII-MOOP-2706-FINAL.pdf.
3 The hypothetical angioplasty costs are based on real data compiled by BlueCross BlueShield of the
rates actually paid for angioplasties in Los Angeles. BLUECROSS BLUESHIELD ET AL., A STUDY OF COST
VARIATION FOR PERCUTANEOUS CORONARY INTERVENTION (ANGIOPLASTIES) IN THE U.S. 4, (2015),
https://bluehealthintelligence.com/pdf/Cardiac_Cost_Variation%5B2%5D.pdf. Price differentials are just as
stark for common tests. In Ohio, a study found that the price for a standard pregnancy ultrasound varied from
$183 to $522. HEALTH CARE COST INST., NATIONAL CHARTBOOK OF HEALTH CARE PRICES–2015 110 (2016),
http://www.healthcostinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/HCCI-National-Chartbook-of-Health-CarePrices-2015.pdf; Jeff Lagasse, Prices for Healthcare Vary Widely Across States, Even Nearby Cities, Health
Care Cost Institute Says, HEALTHCARE FIN. (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/
news/prices-healthcare-vary-widely-across-states-even-nearby-cities-health-care-cost-institute-says.
4 See, e.g., OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY, INVESTIGATION OF HEALTH CARE COST
TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS (2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/prelim-2010-hcctcd.pdf; Ashish
K. Jha et al., Measuring Efficiency: The Association of Hospital Costs and Quality of Care, 28 HEALTH AFF.
897, 898 (2009); Karen E. Joynt & Ashish K. Jha, The Relationship Between Cost and Quality: No Free
Lunch, 307 JAMA 1082–83 (2012); CHANGE HEALTHCARE, AFFORDING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT:
ENGAGING EMPLOYEES IN FINDING LOWER-COST PREVENTIVE CARE 6 (2012) (finding 755% cost variation for
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Although James is a hypothetical patient, most real patients who receive
medical care in the United States do not know the cost of their care until they
receive the bill.5 By that time, they have already legally committed to pay by
entering into what contract scholars have termed “open price term” contracts.
Imagine going to buy a car and telling the salesperson that you will take it
regardless of the cost, or committing to pay for a hotel or rental car without
knowing the cost. It sounds preposterous, but in health care, courts routinely
enforce these contracts that lack a price term.
The absence of price transparency in patient-provider contracts is highly
problematic.6 Patients suffer from both an imbalance of information and an
imbalance of power. Providers have access to pricing information (working
with insurers) and patients generally do not. Providers set prices. Patients have
little room to negotiate.7
Patients can turn down unnecessary care or seek lower priced care. The
industry is counting on them to do just that.8 There is a significant trend to
make patients shoulder more of the economic burden of their health-care
decisions—through higher deductibles, copays, and co-insurance9—in hopes
diabetes screenings, 364% cost variation for Pap smears, and 132% cost variation for colonoscopies over a
twelve-month period).
5 Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 87–88 (2015);
Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF.
57, 64–66 (2006); DEVON M. HERRICK & JOHN C. GOODMAN, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE
MARKET FOR MEDICAL CARE: WHY YOU DON’T KNOW THE PRICE; WHY YOU DON’T KNOW ABOUT QUALITY;
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT. 1 (2007), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/st296/; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFF., GAO-11-791, HEALTH CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY: MEANINGFUL PRICE INFORMATION IS DIFFICULT
FOR CONSUMERS TO OBTAIN PRIOR TO RECEIVING CARE 2 (2011).
6 See Wendy Netter Epstein, A Contract Solution to the Price Transparency Problem, in
TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITS (I. Glenn
Cohen, Barbara Evans & Holly Lynch eds., forthcoming 2018); see generally Daryl M. Berke, Note, Drive-byDoctoring: Contractual Issues and Regulatory Solutions to Increase Patient Protection From Surprise
Medical Bills, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 170, 189 (2016).
7 Although sometimes uninsured patients can negotiate after receiving the bill.
8 Paul B. Ginsburg, Shopping for Price in Medical Care, 26 HEALTH AFF. 208, 209 (2007).
9 A “deductible” is the amount an insured pays out of pocket for covered health care services before the
plan starts to pay. Deductible, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/deductible/ (last
visited July 3, 2017). For instance, an insured might have to pay the first $2,000 of health expenses before the
plan starts to make payments. Id. “Copay” is short for the term “copayment,” a typically small per-office visit
fee that an insured must pay after satisfying the deductible. Copayment, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/co-payment/ (last visited July 3, 2017). “Coinsurance” describes the
percentage of costs that an insured must pay out of pocket for a covered health service after satisfying the
deductible. Coinsurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/co-insurance/ (last visited
July 3, 2017). For instance, an insured might have to pay 20% of the fee for a procedure and the plan will pay
the other 80%. Id.
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that it will prompt patients to act more like traditional consumers.10 Indeed,
consumer-driven medicine is certain to be a hallmark of any replacement of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA).11
But it is hard for patients to price shop, reduce overtreatment, or even put
pressure on the industry to justify pricing in relation to quality when patients
do not know prices before they enter into binding contracts to pay.12 In a
country where one in five Americans still struggles to pay medical bills and
three in five bankruptcies are attributed to medical costs, it is troubling that
patients lack necessary information to make smart financial decisions, when
possible, about their care.13 Indeed, it is hard to imagine patients doing many
of the things that advocates of consumer-driven health care hope they will do if
patients have no visibility into price at decision-time.14 It is also hard to see
how providers will be incented to compete on the value of care they offer
absent transparency.

10

See, e.g., Rachel Dolan, Health Affairs, Health Policy Brief: High-Deductible Health Plans 1 (2016),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=152 (describing high deductible plans
where “other than certain preventive services, all medical care must be paid for out of pocket until the
deductible is met”).
11 See, e.g., H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3762, 114th Cong. (2015); Ashlea Ebeling, Trump
Calls For Expanding Health Savings Accounts; A Golf Driver On Uncle Sam’s Dime?, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2017,
9:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2017/03/01/trump-calls-for-expanding-health-savingsaccounts-a-golf-driver-on-uncle-sams-dime/#265422bd62ce.
12 Consider the hypothetical patient Michele. Michele had breast cancer, but completed her treatment and
has been deemed cancer free. At her one-year check-up, Michele has no symptoms. But her doctor suggests
that she have a PET scan to be sure there are no metastases elsewhere in her body. Michele and her physician
discuss the risk of the additional radiation from the scan. They never, however, discuss the cost of the
procedure. Michele agrees to undergo the scan, which confirms she is cancer free. She later receives the bill
and learns for the first time that the scan cost $7,000. Given that the scan was not strictly necessary, and that
her doctor could have monitored her in other ways, she knows she would have declined the scan had she
known the cost beforehand. See Peter Ubel, Are High Out-of-Pocket Costs Forcing Patients to Settle for
Substandard Care?, FORBES (May 13, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2016/05/13/arehigh-out-of-pocket-costs-forcing-patients-to-settle-for-substandard-care/#49325c30713a (discussing a patient’s
choice between a more accurate but more costly PET scan and a less costly and probably good enough full
body CT scan).
13 This is not to say that a patient who must undergo a procedure to survive but cannot afford the cost
should turn it down. But patients consent to much costly medical care that is not necessary. See, e.g., Sana M.
Al-Khatib et al., Non-Evidence-Based ICD Implantations in the United States, 305 JAMA 43, 44 (2011);
Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1067 (2014);
Atul Gawande, Overkill, An Avalanche of Unnecessary Medical Care Is Harming Patients Physically and
Financially. What Can We Do about It?, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande.
14 Consumer-driven health care is controversial for many reasons. See infra Section II.B. This Article
does not defend the principles of consumer-driven health care. Rather, it recognizes that the industry has
strongly embraced market principles that cannot work absent price transparency.
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Questions concerning incomplete contracts—of which open price term
contracts are one variant15—have dominated contracts scholarship for the last
several decades.16 Scholars have pondered why incomplete contracts arise,17
whether they should be enforceable,18 and how courts should fill gaps left by
the parties.19 There has also been much scholarly debate on the desirability of
relative completeness in contract drafting.20 Despite this scholarly attention,
however, a coherent legal framework for analyzing incomplete contracts and a
theoretical basis for understanding existing doctrine have been elusive.
In part, this is due to competing conceptions of what values matter most.
The law and economics account has mostly focused on the role of transaction
costs. While it may be more or less costly to detail a deal up front, depending
in large part on the level of complexity and uncertainty in the deal, doing so
may reduce expenditures down the line because parties are clear about their
obligations.21 In general, law and economics scholars assume that detailed
15 See infra Section I.C for a discussion of why these agreements should be considered open price term
contracts.
16 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–95 (1989); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a
Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 728 (2006); Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to
Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 390 (2004); Nellie
Eunsoo Choi, Contracts with Open or Missing Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common
Law: A Proposal for Unification, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 51 (2003); Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are
All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100 GEO. L.J. 5 (2011); Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms
in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 997 (1992); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261,
268–71, 311 (1985); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN ST. L.
REV. 987, 1009 (2012); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1581, 1583 (2005); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1641, 1644–45 (2003); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 818 (2006) (examining the choice to use vague terms when precise provisions could have
been employed).
17 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 92–94; Baker & Krawiec, supra note 16, at 729; George S. Geis,
An Embedded Options Theory of Indefinite Contracts, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1664, 1668–70 (2006) (discussing
several theories of incomplete contracts).
18 Gergen, supra note 16, at 1062 (1992) (arguing for court enforcement of open contracts); Scott, supra
note 16, at 1644–45 (discussing self-enforcement of incomplete contracts).
19 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 91–92 (providing a theory for how courts and
legislatures should set default rules for contracts absent essential terms); Ben-Shahar, supra note 16, at 391–93
(arguing for a pro-defendant interpretation of incomplete contracts).
20 See Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 302
(2014) (arguing “good” contracts are not necessarily detailed and specific); Jody Freeman, Extending Public
Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1351 (2003); Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts
and Public Ownership; Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. 70 (2003);
Scott, supra note 16, at 1663 (summarizing studies).
21 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1584; Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 268–71.
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contracts reduce the likelihood that litigation will ensue later.22 On the other
hand, a level of incompleteness is preferable in the law and economics account
when the cost of detailed up-front drafting exceeds expected gains.23
More recent work in the behavioral sciences takes a different approach.
Rather than viewing incompleteness only as a cost that makes eventual
litigation more likely, this work has identified benefits to incompleteness in
building relational capital between the parties.24 Incompleteness, particularly
regarding task specificity, can prompt feelings of trust and foster collaboration
between the parties.25 Completeness, on the other hand, can crowd out an
agent’s intrinsic motivation.26 This work has also identified negative cognitive
implications of specification—namely, that specification prompts agents to
adhere to the enumerated contractual requirements and to lose sight of the
overall purpose of the deal.27
These two strands of scholarship inform a set of criteria for analyzing
contractual completeness. In particular, this analytical framework addresses the
question of how best to determine the desirability of relative completeness in
drafting. It argues that when transaction costs of detailing are low, information
asymmetry is high, and incompleteness is unlikely to build relational capital
between the parties, a more complete contract is desirable. But when a deal is
complex and uncertain, making transaction costs of drafting high, both parties
are adequately informed, and there is a significant need for trust and
collaboration to develop, a less detailed contract is desirable.28
22

Epstein, supra note 20, at 305–06.
Scott & Triantis, supra note 16, at 816, 823 (2006) (explaining that parties invest in transaction costs
until they exceed the expected benefit to be gained by the contract).
24 See infra Section III.A and accompanying notes 222–227.
25 Michal Shur-Ofry & Ofer Tur-Sinai, Constructive Ambiguity: IP Licenses as a Case Study, 48 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 391, 392, 412–15 (2015). See also Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard
Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 91, 126
(2000) (“[D]etail makes for complexity, and complexity can sow distrust, overwhelm the cognitive capacities
of the parties, [and] absorb resources . . . .”). Note, however, that medical pricing opacity does not seem likely
to produce trust. See infra Section III.C at pages 44–47 and accompanying notes.
26 See Edward Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 109–10 (1971) (finding that college students will stop playing puzzles for free after
being paid to solve them); Epstein, supra note 20 (summarizing the literature on crowd-out effects).
27 See Christina E. Shalley et al., The Effects of Personal and Contextual Characteristics on Creativity:
Where Should We Go from Here?, 30 J. MGMT. 933, 935–36 (2004); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex
Stein, Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 185–86 (2015).
28 In past work, I explored the doctrinal roadblocks to less complete contract drafting and argued that in
certain circumstances, these roadblocks stymied the use of efficient incomplete contracts. Epstein, supra note
20, at 299–300. But that is only half the story. At the other end of the spectrum, courts enforce (and thereby
incentivize) incomplete contracts where they should not, as the health-care example illustrates.
23
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In this conception, a simple sales contract for widgets would probably not
benefit from less complete drafting. Drafting a complete contract is a low-cost
endeavor, and there is little to be gained relationally from leaving it
incomplete. The sole purpose of entering into a binding contract in a
transaction like that is to ensure compliance.29 But the contract in which a firm
partners with another to co-develop new technology might be a good candidate
for less complete drafting.30
Applying these criteria to the health-care example suggests that enforcing
open price term patient-provider contracts is out of step with theory.31
Transaction costs of detailing would, for the most part, be low. Many health
services would be both easy and inexpensive to price ex ante. For instance, a
hospital should easily be able to price a standard x-ray, even with the minor
complication that different insurers have negotiated different rates.32 The same
is true even for more complicated, but still highly standardized procedures like
a colonoscopy or cataract surgery.33 Certain emergency-room treatment and
inherently uncertain procedures like complicated surgeries provide exceptions,
but do not account for the bulk of medical care.34 Information asymmetry is
high. Providers have far superior access to price information than patients,
particularly in a world where health pricing varies tremendously in
unpredictable ways and where it is so dependent on understanding a complex
numerical code for medical procedures.35 Finally, it is hard to imagine that
behavioral benefits (like increased trust) would follow from a provider’s
failure to include a price term. While the doctor-patient relationship is
important, and the provision of medical care is not exactly akin to the sale of a
29 See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Parallel Contract, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 139, 140 (2013) (describing a classical,
dyadic account of contract law).
30 Epstein, supra note 20, at 299–300.
31 When there is a mismatch between theory and doctrine, it does not necessarily mean that the doctrine
is incorrect. For the reasons discussed more fully in section III.C, however, it is the case here that the doctrine
is flawed.
32 A computer database could clearly spit out an accurate price once a patient’s insurance information is
input into the system.
33 Cf. HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT ASSOC., RECONSTRUCTING HOSPITAL PRICING SYSTEMS: A CALL TO
ACTION FOR HOSPITAL FINANCIAL LEADERS 22–23 (2007) (calling for standardized pricing throughout healthcare organizations).
34 See Michael H. Lee et al., Owning the Cost of Emergency Medicine: Beyond 2%, 62 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 498, 498 (2013); see also Cost of Emergency Care Fact Sheet, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY
PHYSICIANS, http://newsroom.acep.org/fact_sheets?item=29928 (last visited Sept. 13, 2017).
35 The trend toward bundled payment for episodes of care may make it somewhat easier to determine
prices, but this method of pricing is still in its infancy. See, e.g., Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2013-Fact-sheetsitems/2013-01-31.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).
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widget, leaving out the price term does not seem likely to foster that
relationship in the same way that a more open-ended contract for innovation
would foster collaboration between two innovating entities.
Contract doctrine should encourage patients and providers to enter into
more complete contracts that contain a price term, not enforce contracts that
lack a material term. The law getting it wrong in this context has important and
severe consequences for an industry that makes up one quarter of the federal
budget.36 This Article is the first to turn to contract law as the source of a
solution. To this point, policymakers have focused on legislative solutions to
the price transparency problem.37 Despite some legislative success, price
transparency remains a problem.
Courts should fill price gaps with an information-forcing penalty default.
Penalty defaults select terms that at least one party would not want to force
parties to contract around the default.38 In this case, if a provider did not
include a contractual price where it would have been reasonable to do so, a
penalty default rule would fill the open price term with a price of $0. This
approach is analogous to how the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) finds
contracts to be unenforceable if they lack a quantity term (essentially filling
those contracts with a quantity of zero). While $0 may seem like a harsh
penalty, filling the gap with the reasonable value or quantum meruit would be
insufficient to induce requisite changes in the market.
In practice, assume that our hypothetical patient, James, signs the standard
contract consenting to bear financial responsibility for his angioplasty. That
contract must include the price of the procedure. If it does not, and James does
not pay, the hospital could not successfully recover damages for breach of
contract. Rather, the court would find that the contract lacks a material term
that must be filled, and would fill that gap with an amount of $0.39 With this

36 See Where Did Every Dollar in Spending Go?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://origin.
heritage.org/multimedia/infographic/2014/12/where-did-every-dollar-in-spending-go.
37 See, e.g., Transparency and Disclosure of Health Costs and Provider Payments: State Actions, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/transparency-and-disclosure-health-costs.aspx#
Legislation (last updated Mar. 2017) (listing enacted state legislation for transparency and disclosure of health
care costs).
38 For a discussion of penalty default rules, see infra Section IV.A. Although penalty defaults have not
been employed in this context, they are currently used in other areas of contract law and doctrine. Id.
39 Alternatively, a court may find a quasi-contract exists by virtue of James consenting to treatment and
treatment being provided. For further discussion, see infra Section IV.B.2.
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change to the common law, providers would be forced to fill the price term at
contract execution to avoid this result.40
Part I describes the incomplete contracts that result when patients consent
to pay for medical procedures without knowing the cost. It then explores the
current doctrinal approach to open price term contracts, in which patientprovider contracts lacking price terms are almost universally enforced.
Part II then explores the problems that lack of price transparency causes in
the modern health-care marketplace. Policymakers argue that making patients
bear more of the cost of health care should prompt them to turn down highcost, low-value care, and should weed out the vast price differentials caused by
market failures.41 Consumer-driven health care, however, will not work absent
price transparency.42
Part III takes up the theoretical debate on incomplete contracts, exploring
both the law and economics and behavioral sciences literatures. From those
literatures, it creates a theoretical framework for assessing the desirability of
completeness in various contract settings. Applying that framework to the
health-care problem, it suggests that the current doctrinal approach is a
mismatch with theory.
Finally, Part IV provides a solution to the price-transparency problem in
health-care provider contracts: an information-forcing penalty default rule. If
providers omit a price term in cases in which it would have been reasonable to
provide one, courts should fill the gap with a price of $0. This penalty to
providers should incentivize them to, instead, include a price in the contract.
Other areas of contract law have employed similar penalty defaults, but
perhaps no area is as ripe for one to be employed as this one.

40 Courts would only employ the penalty default where it would have been reasonable to include a price.
See infra Section III.B (discussing the analytical framework).
41 Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical
Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 674 (2008).
42 Quality metrics are also essential to prevent a race to the bottom based solely on price. See, e.g.,
William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and Antitrust Oversight in
Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 635 n.108, 690 (2016).
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I. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS IN HEALTH CARE
Patients become obligated to pay for their care by entering into contracts.43
If a patient is uninsured, the patient signs an agreement accepting full financial
responsibility for the cost of treatment, whatever it ends up being.44 If a patient
is insured, the patient contracts with an insurance company; the insurance
company contracts with providers (who become “in-network”); and the patient
also contracts directly with the provider. In a hospital setting, these patientprovider contracts are typically titled “Conditions of Admission” forms. They
almost always contain language binding the patient to pay whatever the cost of
treatment ends up being. Terms vary, but the Cedars Sinai Conditions of
Admission Form is a typical example of the language used:
FINANCIAL AGREEMENT The undersigned agrees . . . that in
consideration of the services to be rendered to the Patient, he / she
hereby individually obligates himself / herself to pay the account of
the Hospital in accordance with the regular rates and terms of the
Hospital . . . .45

These agreements almost never specify the cost that the patient is agreeing to
bear.
A. Open Price Term Contracts Between Patients and Providers
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that patients do not know the cost of
care before they consent to treatment. Authors have written articles with
provocative titles like: “I tried to find out how much my son’s birth would cost.
No one would tell me.”;46 “How much will surgery cost? Good luck finding
43 In an emergency, it may be that a quasi-contract is formed, but for the most part patients contract for
health care. See Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical Consumers, 96
GEO. L.J. 583, 595 (2008) (“Emergencies require that quasi-contracts substitute for actual agreements;
otherwise, providers might be less willing to respond to emergencies.”).
44 Mikey Rox, Wise Bread, 7 Smart Ways to Negotiate Your Medical Bills, TIME: MONEY (June 29,
2015), http://time.com/money/3938748/7-smart-ways-to-negotiate-your-medical-bills/. Although, practically,
there may be post-treatment negotiation for uninsured patients.
45 Conditions of Admission, supra note 1 (emphasis added). Such an agreement is typical among
healthcare systems. See, e.g., Patient Financial Agreement and Responsibilities, PIEDMONT HEALTHCARE,
http://www.piedmont.org/media/file/PPG-Patient-Financial-Agreement-Responsibilities.pdf (last visited Sept.
16, 2017). Independent physician offices also tend to use similar language in their agreements. See, e.g., Office
Policies & Consent to Treat, DUPAGE PEDIATRICS, LTD., http://www.dupagepediatrics.com/docs/OfficePolicies-Consent-to-Treat.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2016) (stating patients must “pay any outstanding charges
not covered by their insurance carrier”).
46 Johnny Harris, I Tried to Find Out How Much My Son’s Birth Would Cost. No One Would Tell Me.,
VOX (May 5, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/5/5/11591592/birth-cost-hospital-bills.
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out”;47 and “The Doctor Will Charge You Now—But You Don’t Know How
Much.”48
A recent study found that “63 percent of those who had received medical
care during the last two years did not know the cost of the treatment until the
bill arrived.”49 And it is not that patients can even guess the general ballpark of
expenses. While consumers can estimate the price of a new Honda Accord
within $300, those same consumers were off by $8,100 in estimating the cost
of a four-day hospital stay.50
Systematic studies have also confirmed what many people probably did not
need a study for—many health-care providers will not provide reasonable
estimates of cost even after specific requests.51 One group of scholars
attempted to determine prices for hip replacement and found nearly 40% of
providers would not provide a complete estimate.52 Indeed, 15% of the topranked hospitals surveyed “were not able to provide any price whatsoever.”53
47

Steve James, How Much Will Surgery Cost? Good Luck Finding Out, NBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2013
10:32 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/50748682/ns/health-health_care/t/how-much-will-surgery-cost-goodluck-finding-out/#.WVsAUxPyvBI; see also Lisa Aliferis, How Much for a Hip Replacement? Good Luck
Trying to Finding Out, KQED: NEWS (Feb. 11, 2013), http://ww2.kqed.org/stateofhealth/2013/02/11/howmuch-for-a-hip-replacement-good-luck-trying-to-find-out/; Martha Bebinger & Sacha Pfeiffer, Trying to Find
the Cost of a Medical Procedure? Good Luck, WBUR (Aug. 2, 2012), http://legacy.wbur.org/2012/08/02/
health-care-shopping.
48 Cody Fenwick, The Doctor Will Charge You Now—But You Don’t Know How Much, PATCH (May 23,
2016, 2:32 PM), http://patch.com/us/across-america/doctor-will-charge-you-now-you-dont-know-how-much-0.
49 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5. Like other sources, the Kaiser Institute’s survey shows that a
majority of people find it difficult to access health-care costs. Bianca DiJulio et al., Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll: 2015, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 21, 2015), http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-healthtracking-poll-april-2015/.
50 Kathy Gurchiek, Consumers Savvier About Cost of a New Car Than a Hospital Stay, SOC’Y FOR HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 2, 2005, 8:00 AM), http://www.shrm.org/hrnews_published/CMS_013559.asp; see
also Tracey M. Budz, Great-West Healthcare Consumer Health Care Survey Reveals Mixed Bag of Results;
Participants Average Prediction Price of a Honda Accord Within $300 But Are Off by $8,100 on a Four-Day
Hospital Stay, BUSINESS WIRE (July 28, 2005, 8:57 AM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/
20050728005536/en/Great-West-Healthcare-Consumer-Health-Care-Survey-Reveals.
51 Patients may have better luck obtaining this information from insurers, but for most procedures,
insurers need to know the billing code the provider intends to use to generate accurate cost information, absent
a preapproval process. Patients can try to match the procedure name to a billing code, but there are often
multiple codes associated with a procedure name. E.g., That CT Scan Costs How Much? Health-Care Prices
Are All Over the Map, Even Within Your Plan’s Network, CONSUMER REP. (July 2012), http://
www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/07/that-ct-scan-costs-how-much/index.htm; Frequently Asked
Questions, FAIR HEALTH CONSUMER, https://www.fairhealthconsumer.org/#faq (last visited Sept. 16, 2017.).
52 Jamie A. Rosenthal, Xin Lu & Peter Cram, Availability of Consumer Prices from U.S. Hospitals for a
Common Surgical Procedure, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 427, 428 (2013).
53 Id. At least providers have chosen not to find out the price. Providers clearly have access to this
information. For further discussion, see infra Section IV.B.1.
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Another study hypothesized that pricing may be more easily obtained for
common services like diagnostic tests.54 But they found that while 95% of
hospitals could provide parking prices, only 15% could provide pricing
information for electrocardiograms, which they describe as a “simple and
uniform medical service.”55 Physical and behavioral scientist Peter Ubel
conducted a study and determined that physicians and patients failed to discuss
health care expenses in almost two-thirds of clinical interactions.56
There are many reasons that patients may not be finding out about prices
before they commit to pay. First, some patients simply do not ask, perhaps
because some (probably rightly) assume that the information will be difficult if
not impossible to obtain.57 Patients also may not ask because it is culturally
taboo to do so.58 For others, insurance coverage may still mean that cost
information is not relevant (although the size of this group seems to be
decreasing).59 Some may believe that price information is immaterial to
decisions about care because health care is not a traditional consumer good.

54 Jillian R.H. Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, Availability of Consumer Prices from Philadelphia Area
Hospitals for Common Services: Electrocardiograms vs. Parking, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 292, 293 (2014)
(“We also discovered that hospitals almost invariably could provide the price of parking and that parking was
often discounted. This demonstrates not only that hospitals are able to provide cost information by telephone
but, we infer, that they can respond to consumers’ concern about cost.”).
55 Id.; see also Sarah Kliff, Nearly All Hospitals Will Give You the Price of Parking. Barely Any Will
Give You the Price of Health Care., WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/03/nearly-all-hospitals-will-give-you-the-price-of-parking-barely-any-will-giveyou-the-price-of-care/.
56 Peter A. Ubel et al., Study of Physician and Patient Communication Identifies Missed Opportunities to
Help Reduce Patients’ Out-of-Pocket Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF. 654, 660 (2016) (citing Wynn G. Hunter et
al., What Strategies Do Physicians and Patients Discuss to Reduce Out-of-Pocket Costs? Analysis of CostSaving Strategies in 1755 Outpatient Clinic Visits, MED. DECISION MAKING (2016)).
57 See Amelia Laing, Most Patients Don’t Ask Doctors About Cost, but They Should, ITRIAGE (Mar. 5,
2014), https://blog.itriagehealth.com/patients-dont-doctors-cost/ (highlighting the difficulty of receiving a cost
estimate).
58 See generally Cultural Competence in Health Care: Is It Important for People with Chronic
Conditions?, GEO. U. HEALTH POL’Y INST. (Feb. 2004), https://hpi.georgetown.edu/agingsociety/pubhtml/
cultural/cultural.html (noting the importance of providers being able to provide culturally competent services
that meet the social, cultural, and linguistic needs of patients).
59 See infra Section II.B.
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You pay for health care without concern for price.60 But studies suggest that
this group is also likely small.61
Second, patients may not know about cost because doctors and hospitals
rarely offer such information without prompting. Medical societies and trade
associations have traditionally discouraged price disclosure to avoid price
competition among their members.62 Many providers benefit from price
opacity, particularly if their pricing is high and so is their demand.63 Doctors
and hospitals traditionally have not competed for patients based on price
because much of the cost of healthcare was covered by third parties such as
employers, insurance companies, or government.64 To some physicians,
medical ethics counsel against price discussions because a physician should
not withhold beneficial treatments because of cost.65
Third, sometimes patients ask and providers still do not provide the
information.66 Some cannot provide pricing because it is unclear at the time a
patient consents to a procedure exactly what will be required.67 A surgery may
go smoothly or there may be complications. It may be hard to predict how
many hospital days will be required after the procedure for recovery. But this
seems unlikely to account for a high percentage of cases, particularly as more
of medicine becomes standardized and evidence-based.68 It may be hard to
price the care of the ER patient hit by a car, but it should be much simpler to
60

Patients may not see medical care as something for which they would comparison shop, particularly if
they assume (often incorrectly) that price is correlated with quality. Sarah Kliff, Half of Americans Think
Expensive Medical Care Is Better. They’re Wrong, VOX (July 21, 2014, 12:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/
2014/7/21/5922835/half-of-americans-think-expensive-medical-care-is-better-theyre-wrong.
61 It is possible that more patients may seek cost information given the incentives of Consumer Driven
Health Plans (CDHPs). But even if they ask for price, the current system generally does not require that they
be told. See infra Section I.C.
62 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5; Barak D. Richman et al., Overbilling and Informed Financial
Consent—A Contractual Solution, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 396 (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.nejm.org/
doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1205225#t=article (“Long-standing professional norms prevent discussion of fees
before a physician cares for the sick . . . .”).
63 See Reinhardt, supra note 5.
64 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5.
65 Kevin R. Riggs & Peter A. Ubel, Overcoming Barriers to Discussing Out-of-Pocket Costs with
Patients, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 849, 849 (2014) (“Medical ethics has traditionally held that the physician
should not withhold beneficial treatments because of cost.”).
66 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5 (“Typically, neither the hospital nor the doctor will know the cost
until the procedure is completed.”).
67 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, American Way of Birth, Costliest in the World, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/01/health/american-way-of-birth-costliest-in-the-world.html.
68 For a discussion on evidence-based medicine, see Stefan Timmermans & Aaron Mauck, The Promises
and Pitfalls of Evidence-Based Medicine, 24 HEALTH AFF. 18, 25–26 (2005).
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price a diagnostic test.69 Today, many surgeries are relatively routine, and at
least an estimate should be accessible beforehand.
Some providers have difficulty providing price information because billing
practices are complicated and decentralized. For hospital procedures, many
individual practitioners will still send separate bills.70 And as a purely technical
matter, many facilities bill patients separately for every service they provide.71
Additionally, there is not a single price for each procedure, but rather a
different price negotiated with each insurer (which differs from the price
charged to uninsureds).
However, there is a movement to simplify billing practices, as well as a big
trend away from fee-for-service compensation and toward bundled payment
systems in which hospitals will get one payment from Medicare or a private
insurer for an entire course of treatment.72 And because hospitals negotiate
rates with private insurers, they should only need a patient’s insurance
information to determine a negotiated rate.73
While health-care costs remain opaque, that is not to say that there has been
no progress on price transparency. In recent years, Medicare has started
69 See, e.g., David Belk, Diagnostic Tests, TRUE COST OF HEALTH-CARE, http://truecostofhealthcare.net/
diagnostic-tests/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (listing the prices of commonly ordered medical tests including
various blood, cardiology, and radiology tests). But see Ryan Flinn, E.R. Visit Costs Hard to Predict with $4 to
$24,000 Swings, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0227/er-visit-costs-hard-to-predict-with-4-to-24-000-swings.
70 See HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5; Julie Appleby, Ask 3 Hospitals How Much a Knee Operation
Will Cost . . . And You’re Likely to Get a Headache: Telling Patients to Be Better Shoppers Just Isn’t Working,
USA TODAY (May 9, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/educate/college/healthscience/articles/20060514.
htm; see also Maura Calsyn, Shining Light on Health Care Prices, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2014,
8:45 AM) (“[D]octors make referrals without knowing the prices charged by other providers; they select
medical devices for use in procedures without knowing the costs of the products or whether less-expensive
alternatives may produce similar or even better outcomes. A recent study found that orthopedic surgeons
correctly estimated the cost of a device only 21 percent of the time.”).
71 Richman et al., supra note 62 (discussing that “enormous accounting complexity causes both providers
and patients to lack the capacity to negotiate and assent to a bill”); Gina Kolata, What Are a Hospital’s Costs?
Utah System Is Trying to Learn, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/health/whatare-a-hospitals-costs-utah-system-is-trying-to-learn.html?_r=0.
72 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012); Wendy Netter
Epstein, Public-Private Contracting and the Reciprocity Norm, 64 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1, 10, 12 (2014) (noting
incentive mismatches can result in higher costs).
73 Technologically speaking there are some hurdles. For instance, hospitals and doctors’ offices would
need to be able to obtain real-time information on insureds’ benefits and eligibility. Hospitals would need to
know a doctor’s negotiated billing rate to give a patient a complete picture of the expense. See generally ANNE
B. CASTO & ELIZABETH FORRESTAL, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTHCARE REIMBURSEMENT (5th ed. 2015). Building
out these capabilities is not without cost, but it can certainly be done. Id.
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releasing information on what it pays providers.74 Some states have passed
price transparency laws.75 Some websites offer fair market prices for physician
services and diagnostic tests according to geographic region.76 Further, some
employers and insurers have started providing information to patients,
particularly in the form of online calculators that patients may use in an
attempt to predict how much a procedure will cost, although this trend has not
yet become widespread among private insurers.77
But often laws require that patients request the information, not that it be
disclosed absent a request.78 And when information is available, it is either not
in a form that is useful to consumers (e.g., list prices rather than negotiated
insurance rates)79 or it is inaccurate (many online calculators).80 Despite some
movement, report cards on state transparency laws suggest that patients are
still struggling to gain access to accurate pricing information.81

74

See Medicare Unmasked, WALL STREET J. (May 19, 2016), http://graphics.wsj.com/medicare-billing/
(last visited July 4, 2017). These releases are done in bulk and are not individual specific. See id.
75 For example, Massachusetts has a medical price transparency law that requires physicians and
hospitals to provide cost information for procedures and services. See Martha Bebinger, The Price of Health
Care Is Finally Public (in One State), TIME: MONEY (Oct. 11, 2014), http://time.com/money/3484955/healthcare-prices-massachusetts/. Notably, New Hampshire, Colorado, and Maine received an A according to the
Catalyst for Payment Reform Report Card due to the quality of their price reporting and transparency websites.
Stephanie Van Vreede, 2016 State Price Transparency Report Card Is Released, CATALYSIS (July 27, 2016),
https://createvalue.org/articles_and_news/2016-state-price-transparency-report-card-is-released/.
76 See generally CASTLIGHT HEALTH, http://www.castlighthealth.com (last visited July 4, 2017)
(providing price data for healthcare services); FAIR HEALTH, http://www.fairhealth.org (last visited July 4,
2017) (providing price data for healthcare services); HEALTHCARE BLUEBOOK, http://www.
healthcarebluebook.com (last visited July 4, 2017) (providing price data for healthcare services).
77 Elana Gordon, Patients Want to Price-Shop for Care, but Online Tools Unreliable, NPR (Nov. 30,
2015, 4:54 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/11/30/453087857/patients-want-to-priceshop-for-care-but-online-tools-unreliable; see also Calsyn, supra note 70. California’s Department of
Insurance recently released a new tool for consumers to look up health care costs, but most of the website does
not work. California Healthcare Compare, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/health/
california-health-cost-and-quality-consumer-reports/index.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2016).
78 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1339.55, .56, .58, .585 (West 2016).
79 Erin C. Fuse Brown, Irrational Hospital Pricing, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 11, 14 (2014); U.S.
Health Care Reform, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT (May 2015), http://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/
cause-reports/health-care-reform (“For example, listed prices are not the same as a patient’s out-of-pocket
costs, and the listed price most likely reflects only one part of a patient’s treatment.”).
80 Online calculators are unreliable and not legally binding. Gordon, supra note 77.
81 CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM – HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST., REPORT CARD
ON STATE TRANSPARENCY LAWS (2015), http://www.hci3.org/wp-content/uploads/files/files/2015_Report_
PriceTransLaws_06.pdf; Beth Kutscher, 45 States Get an F on Healthcare Price Transparency, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (July 8, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150708/NEWS/150709929;
Transparency and Disclosure of Health Costs and Provider Payments: State Actions, supra note 37.
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In general, health-care costs remain opaque to patients and vary
considerably in highly unpredictable ways. In most cases, providers have far
superior information on pricing than individual patients have, and they readily
have the resources to provide a price.
B. Doctrinal Approach to Open Price Term Contracts
Open price term agreements are not uncommon.82 They arise when parties
cannot agree on price, intentionally leave the price to be set later,83 or agree to
a variable price term that does not later fill the gap (e.g., when a reference
market collapses or other methods to determine a price do not materialize).84
For instance, agreements to renew a lease often do not name a price at the time
of drafting.85 Similarly, franchise agreements typically leave the product price
term open because of the need to frequently adjust the price of goods over
time.86 In general, contracts for the sale of goods in which the product price
fluctuates do not reference a specific price (but may refer to a method for
calculating a price).87 In addition, service contracts, such as a brokerage
contract, also commonly leave the price term open at the time of drafting.88

82 See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 16, at 1026 (noting open price terms are preferable because they align the
parties’ risks in entering the contract).
83 It is possible to have an agreement to agree on price when the parties have made it clear that they
intend to be legally bound and the court nonetheless finds the contract enforceable. William L. Prosser, Open
Price in Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 16 MINN. L. REV. 733, 736 (1932).
84 Id. at 734 (“[T]o make a binding agreement, and at the same time to avoid . . . the risks of a changing
market as between the parties, . . . in a contract for the sale of goods, the price is left open for future
determination.”).
85 See, e.g., Moolenaar v. Co-Build Companies, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 980, 984 (D.V.I. 1973) (noting a retail
lease included a renewal clause that left rate to be later determined).
86 Douglas C. Berry et al., Open Price Agreements: Good Faith Pricing in the Franchise Relationship,
27 FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 45 (2007); Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 927–28 (1990).
87 For example, oil and gas companies may prefer to use open price terms due to the fluctuating
availability of the resource. See Berry et al., supra note 86, at 46 (“[P]rice increases would be disastrous to any
long-term supply contract between a gasoline refiner and dealer that had fixed prices at the time of execution
of the contract . . . .”); Gergen, supra note 16, at 1036 (noting oil and gas leases may use open price terms due
to uncertainty); see, e.g., United Energy Distribs., Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., No. 1:07-CV-2644-RBH, 2008
WL 4458991, at *8 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2008) (noting that U.C.C. § 2-305(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1977) was drafted to address open price term industries such as the oil and gas industries).
88 By custom within the brokerage industry, the seller contracts to pay the broker 6% commission. Like a
patient contracting for health care, the seller does not know exactly how much he will have to pay. See Bruce
M. Owens, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29
STAN. L. REV. 931, 947–48 (1977).
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Courts have struggled over time with whether agreements that lack a price
term should be deemed enforceable. At common law, a legally enforceable
contract required offer, acceptance, consideration, and reasonably definite
terms.89 A price term was essential to the formation of a binding contract.90
Without specification of price, courts held agreements too indefinite to be
enforceable. The comments to the First Restatement of Contracts § 32
summarize the prevailing view in 1932:
The law cannot subject a person to a contractual duty or give another
a contractual right unless the character thereof is fixed by the
agreement of the parties. A statement by A that he will pay B what A
chooses is no promise.91

The comments to § 32 further illustrated unenforceable contracts:
A promises B to sell to him and B promises A to buy of him goods
“at cost plus a nice profit.” The promise is too indefinite to form a
contract.92
A promises B to do a specified piece of work and B promises A to
pay a price to be thereafter mutually agreed. As the only method of
settling the price is dependent on future agreement of the parties, and
as either party may refuse to agree, there is no contract.93

Cases from the first half of the twentieth century were consistent on the
point, with some exceptions, that the lack of a price term rendered a contract
unenforceable.94 Courts reasoned that without having set a price, parties did
89 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (“An offer must be so
definite in its terms, or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and performances to be
rendered by each party are reasonably certain.”); Choi, supra note 16, at 51 (“Under traditional contract
doctrine, contracts with any indefiniteness were not legally binding . . . .”); Prosser, supra note 83, at 734–35
(“The price is an essential term of the contract; without it there is no sufficient consideration for the seller’s
promise, and no measure of the buyer’s obligation to perform.”). Note that § 32 of the First Restatement later
became § 33 of the Second Restatement, with significant changes. Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
CONTRACTS § 32 (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (requiring certainty in the terms of the offer), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (permitting contract formation as long as the terms
“provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy”).
90 See Prosser, supra note 83, at 734–35.
91 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 32 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
92 Id. at cmt. c, illus. 6.
93 Id. at cmt. c, illus. 10.
94 See, e.g., Jordan v. Buick Motor Co., 75 F.2d 447, 449 (7th Cir. 1935) (finding an agreement
unenforceable when the number and price of cars to be handled was not fixed in the purported contract);
Tribble v. J. W. Greer Co., 83 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (D. Mass. 1949) (finding a contract unenforceable when
there was no certainty as to price or a formula for fixing price); Sun Printing & Publ’g Ass’n v. Remington
Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470, 471–72 (N.Y. 1923) (stating that a contract without an agreed upon price is
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not convey intent to be legally bound. Rather, those parties merely entered into
non-binding agreements to agree.95
This doctrinal approach had a number of benefits. It was a bright-line rule
that gave parties a clear directive: agree on price or the contract will not be
enforceable. Parties wishing to be able to fall back on court sanction knew that
their agreements must contain a price. Forcing parties to agree on price ex ante
usually required expending fewer resources than a court would have to spend
later to determine a price in litigation, assuming that the parties could more
efficiently make such decisions than the courts. Also, courts may find it
difficult to fill a contractual price gap with a reasonable price term based on
limited information.96 Courts do not have expertise to rewrite contracts in
which the parties did not agree at the outset. Some scholars also believed that
giving parties the incentive to agree on price translated to a higher probability
of deal success and a lower likelihood that litigation would later ensue.97 Put
another way, if price were not agreed to at deal execution, it would more likely
than not become a point of contention later on. As such, the rule that no price
term meant no enforceability also conserved judicial resources by reducing
likelihood of litigation and reducing factual inquiry if litigation does occur.98
Finally, courts reasoned that failing to enforce a contract in which the parties
had not agreed to a price honored the intention of the parties.99
But there were also downsides to the traditional, bright-line rule. For
example, it provided little flexibility to parties that were starting to structure
more and more complicated and uncertain deals. Sometimes, it also had the
effect of thwarting the intent of the parties that did actually intend to be bound
to a deal despite the lack of a price. In 1951, the U.C.C. responded to these
concerns with § 2-305.100
merely an agreement to agree); Machesky v. Milwaukee, 253 N.W. 169, 169 (Wis. 1934) (finding a contract
unenforceable when there was no certainty as to price or a formula for fixing price). But see, e.g., Augeri v.
C.F. Wooding Co., 378 A.2d 538, 540 (Conn. 1977) (finding that an agreement too indefinite for enforcement
may be made definite by entire or partial performance); ROBERT E. SCOTT & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT
LAW AND THEORY 259 (1988) (explaining instances of contracts in which there was partial performance).
95 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1379, 1393 (1995) (discussing the requirement of certainty in classical contract theory).
96 Courts filling such gaps with little basis also raise equity concerns.
97 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 1583–84.
98 See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 42 (2014).
99 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 16, at 1583–84.
100 See U.C.C. § 2-305 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (replacing Uniform Sales Act §§ 9–
10).
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Consistent with the general goals of the U.C.C. to take a more flexible
approach to contract formation and to prioritize the intent of the parties, the
U.C.C. explicitly permits the formation of binding contracts that lack a price
term, as long as there is evidence that the parties intended to be bound and a
reasonable price could be set by the court ex post.101 In general, under the
modern approach to contract law, courts are more willing to fill gaps left by the
parties.102
The U.C.C. approach stemmed from a recognition that complex
contingencies affect supply and demand of products and that markets for
products may be volatile. These uncertainties can make it difficult, if not
impossible, for parties to specify a price for goods at the time a contract is
signed.103 However, parties desire assurances that deals will hold the force of
law. Consistent with the general U.C.C. commitment to facilitating commerce,
§ 2-305 provides parties with flexibility and options for how to structure their
agreements. It contemplates that parties can leave the price term open to be
filled later by agreement (or, alternatively, with a reasonable price determined
by the court if no agreement is reached). It also contemplates reference to a
market price and provides a default for filling the open price term if that
reference becomes unavailable.
Whereas the common law read an open price term to mean that the parties
did not intend to be bound, the U.C.C. assumes the opposite—that parties do
intend to be bound despite lack of prior agreement on price.104 This is a
standard, not a rule, but for the most part, courts deciding cases under the
U.C.C. approach are much more likely to find that parties intended to be bound
to the agreement. Courts will err on the side of saving a contract and filling a
missing price term (to the extent possible) rather than simply finding
agreements unenforceable.
The U.C.C. approach has several benefits. It facilitates the formation of
contracts in situations in which parties find it hard or impossible to agree to a
price, but nonetheless want to enter into a deal. It may therefore better
101 See Prosser, supra note 83, at 736–37; see also John R. Browning et al., Project, A Comparison of
California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1134 (1963)
(arguing uncertainty due to failure to set a price should not invalidate a contract because parties contemplated
uncertainty and nonetheless agreed to be bound).
102 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 16, at 267–73.
103 See id.; see also Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV.
2005, 2013 (1987).
104 Scott, supra note 16, at 1650.
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effectuate the intent of the parties. It also permits parties to spend fewer
resources negotiating a price at a time when it would be both difficult and
costly to do so.105 It might actually be more efficient to permit parties to defer
price negotiation until after contract execution depending on the
circumstances.
But as the bright-line common law rule provided the parties with more
certainty and with incentive to negotiate price ex ante, the U.C.C. standard
does the opposite. It also has the downside of stretching the resources of the
courts if litigation later occurs because courts filling open price terms must
consider extrinsic evidence and evidence of industry custom and practice to fill
those gaps.
But the U.C.C. only governs the sale of goods,106 and in modern times,
courts have been inconsistent in their approach to open price terms in service
contracts, with some following the more liberal, contextualist approach of the
U.C.C., and others continuing to strike down as unenforceable agreements that
lack an explicit price term.107 Yet courts addressing patient-provider contracts
have been surprisingly uniform in their approach. The next section discusses
case law treatment of this issue.
C. The Enforceability of Patient-Provider Contracts That Lack Price Terms
Courts almost always enforce agreements between patients and providers
that lack a specific price term. They do so partially under the fiction that these
actually are not open price term agreements at all. In addition, courts have
tended to rely on the historical justification that it would be impossible for
providers to commit to a price before the procedure.
First, contracts between patients and providers usually incorporate by
reference the hospital chargemaster. The chargemaster is a file maintained by
hospitals that lists, by code, everything a hospital might charge for and the

105 See Haslund v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 378 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[c]ontracts can
be shorter and simpler and cheaper when courts stand ready to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities”).
106 U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (clarifying that this section is
“restricted to sale of goods”); Choi, supra note 16, at 55 (stating the U.C.C. “explicitly governs sale-of-goods
contracts”).
107 See Choi, supra note 16, at 55 (noting that courts are split in how to deal with service contracts that
lack a price term).
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“standard” price for that item.108 While a “typical hospital bill contains
between ten to fifty items, the chargemaster contains an average of 25,000
[different] items.”109 Items are listed by code numbers, not by procedure name,
diagnosis, or any other descriptor that would be recognizable to a patient.110
Hospitals are permitted to change their chargemaster rates at any time without
notice.111 And in most jurisdictions, there is no requirement that the
chargemaster be posted publicly or otherwise made available to patients.112
The chargemaster does not reflect the rates negotiated by insurance
companies.113 On average, the chargemaster rates are considerably higher than
the rates charged to insureds, but there is much variability.114
While some agreements explicitly incorporate by reference the
chargemaster, others use vaguer language that merely obligates patients to pay
the account or the charges, without further specification. Most courts
nonetheless read in an implied term referencing the chargemaster anyway.115
As a practical matter, however, agreements between patients and providers
are open or indefinite as to price. They are, in real terms, agreements to simply
108 See Brown, supra note 79, at 17; Carrie Pallardy, Deconstructing the Enigmatic Hospital
Chargemaster, BECKER’S HOSPITAL CFO REP. (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/
finance/deconstructing-the-enigmatic-hospital-chargemaster.html.
109 Gerard F. Anderson, From “Soak the Rich” to “Soak the Poor”: Recent Trends in Hospital Pricing,
26 HEALTH AFF. 780, 786 (2007).
110 Anderson, supra note 109, at 786; Brown, supra note 79, at 16; Brown, supra note 5, at 101, 105.
111 Brown, supra note 79, at 17.
112 Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 59 (“With the exception of California, . . . hospitals are not required to post
their chargemasters for public view.”).
113 Further, Erin C. Fuse Brown notes that “[h]ospitals readily concede that chargemaster prices do not
represent the costs of providing the service, or the price any insurer pays, referring to them instead as starting
points . . . .” Erin C. Fuse Brown, Fair Hospital Prices Are Not Charity: Decoupling Hospital Pricing and
Collection Rules from Tax Status, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 509, 517–18 (2016).
114 See id. (“Unlike the prices reached through negotiation between hospitals and health plans, the prices
charged by hospitals to uninsured or underinsured self-pay patients are not the result of bona fide
bargaining . . . .”); Pallardy, supra note 108 (“It is unlikely a hospital chargemaster will ever become available
to the public given the gap between charges and what patients and payers will actually pay. Patients are
concerned with their out-of-pocket expenses, not the convoluted backend of healthcare cost structure.”).
115 See, e.g., DiCarlo v. St. Mary’s Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding price term not open
because “all charges” unambiguously referred to chargemaster rates); Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc.,
980 N.E.2d 306, 308 (Ind. 2012) (reading in reference to chargemaster rates in which contract merely
“guarantee[d] payment of the account” with no other reference to rate); Holland v. Trinity Care Corp., 791
N.W.2d 724, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (referring to “usual and customary charges” in financial agreement
reasonably referenced hospital’s “Charge Master” prices). But see Doe v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., Inc., 46
S.W.3d 191, 197 (Tenn. 2001) (declining to name a definite price term where standard form stated: “I
understand I am financially responsible to the hospital for charges not covered by this authorization.”
(emphasis omitted)).
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let the provider set the price later. Patients usually cannot reference the
chargemaster.116 And even if they are able to obtain a copy, they cannot make
sense of it. Without knowing which codes the hospital intends to bill for (also
not noted in the standard agreement), it would be impossible for a patient to
calculate cost at the time they enter into the agreement. Hospitals can change
their chargemaster prices at any time they choose. It would also be literally
impossible for an insured patient to know the negotiated rate he or she will be
charged by referencing the chargemaster since it does not list negotiated rates.
A hospital essentially reserves the right to later charge whatever it wants as
long as it puts the charge into its chargemaster.117
Interestingly, however, courts tend not to analyze cases challenging the
enforceability of these contracts (or the reasonableness of the price terms) as
open price term cases. Because of the reference (or imputed reference) to the
chargemaster, courts analyze these cases as contracts that incorporate pricing
by reference to an external source. This, however, is fiction.
Whereas there is doctrinal inconsistency in how to approach service
contracts that lack a price term more generally, the doctrine surrounding
patient-provider contracts that lack a price has developed rather uniformly.
Courts almost always enforce such contracts and allow hospitals to fill the
price gap with the chargemaster rates for uninsured patients. As Professors
Mark Hall and Carl Schneider have noted, “[C]ourts have generally tolerated
low levels of specificity in medical contracts.”118 This means that even where
contracts fail to specify a price for the services to be provided, courts find them
enforceable.
Courts provide one primary reason: providers cannot know in advance what
procedures will be necessary when a patient signs the contract obligating
payment. The New Jersey District Court, in DiCarlo v. St. Mary’s Hospital,
explained:
The price term “all charges” is certainly less precise than price term
of the ordinary contract for goods or services in that it does not
116 Doe, 46 S.W.3d at 194 (noting the chargemaster contains confidential, proprietary information that
patients cannot access); see Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 59 (“With the exception of California, which now
requires hospitals to make their chargemasters public, hospitals are not required to post their chargemasters for
public view.”). The contractual reference to a chargemaster is therefore meaningless to a patient desiring to
actually be informed of the price to which he or she is consenting.
117 In the case of insured patients, the provider’s price must be subject to the provider’s negotiated rates
with the insurance company.
118 Hall & Schneider, supra note 41, at 674.
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specify an exact amount to be paid. It is, however, the only practical
way in which the obligations of the patient to pay can be set forth,
given the fact that nobody yet knows just what condition the patient
has, and what treatments will be necessary to remedy what ails him
or her.119

This reasoning is pervasive in court opinions120 and is bolstered by the
sentiment that it is reasonable to assume that whatever the cost, patients will be
willing to pay for necessary treatment.121
Also common, although less so, is the concern that no entity other than the
hospital could reasonably be tasked with supplying a rate ex post due to the
complexity of both the underlying medicine and the market conditions that
affect such rates. According to the DiCarlo court: “A court could not possibly
determine what a ‘reasonable charge’ for hospital services would be without
wading into the entire structure of providing hospital care and the means of
dealing with hospital solvency.”122
Courts do not seem to consider the possibility that providers may be
required to provide a price (or a cost estimate) ex ante, perhaps because they
do not believe it is possible to do so, or maybe because courts only decide
these issues once a test or procedure has already occurred without price
disclosure.
Finally, some courts may be concerned that providers may not agree to
treat patients if providers are worried about later compensation.123 “Patients’

119

DiCarlo, 530 F.3d at 264.
See, e.g., Shelton v. Duke Univ. Health Sys., Inc., 633 S.E.2d 113, 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (“It is
common, almost expected, that a course of treatment embarked upon will, through unforeseen circumstances,
be amended, altered, enhanced, or terminated altogether, and a completely new course of treatment begun. In
light of this, it would be impossible for a hospital to fully and accurately estimate all of the treatments and
costs for every patient before treatment has begun.”).
121 Id.; see also Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 310 (Ind. 2012); Nolte v. Cedars
Sinai Med. Ctr., 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d 737, 744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
122 DiCarlo, 530 F.3d at 264; see also Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184,
193 (S.D. 2007) (quoting Cox v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 631 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“[I]n
a hospital setting, it is not possible to know at the outset what the cost of the treatment will be, because it is not
known what treatment will be medically necessary.”). Courts do, however, engage in this analysis in other
similar contexts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (requiring
courts to assess reasonableness of liquidated damages); Kristin Harlow, Applying the Reasonable Person
Standard to Psychosis: How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733,
1738 (2007) (describing the reasonable person standard of negligence law).
123 See generally Hall, supra note 43, at 585–86 (discussing how the law views those who receive medical
care more as patients than consumers).
120
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and physicians’ contractual obligations are forged in the context of someone
who is sick and vulnerable seeking care in a therapeutic relationship that
entails special responsibility for the patient’s welfare.”124 If a physician must
take on that burden, they must also be ensured payment.125
Most lawsuits that are brought challenging the enforceability of these
contracts come from uninsured patients who argue that the chargemaster prices
the hospital imputes are unreasonable. Presumably, insured patients do not
often sue because even if the court finds that there is no enforceable contract, if
the patient already had the procedure, the hospital would still be entitled to
recovery in quantum meruit and the rate negotiated between the insurer and the
provider would surely be a reasonable rate.126
The next Part discusses the practical implications of this doctrinal choice.
The implicit permission that courts give to providers to charge patients only
after they have consented to treatment impedes progress toward price
transparency, both as to individual patient choices and as to the functioning of
the market writ large.
II. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND THE UNINFORMED PATIENT PROBLEM
That courts enforce contracts between patients and providers lacking price
terms yields a number of significant, negative consequences. For instance, it
squanders the potential of consumer-driven health care to repair market pricing
and mitigate overtreatment. It also means that some patients will unwittingly
continue to incur costs that they cannot afford, which creates negative systemic
consequences.127
A. Moral Hazard in Health Care Increases Costs; Consumer-Driven Health
Care Is Supposed to Fix the Problem
The United States significantly outspends all other industrialized, highincome nations in health spending. Yet the United States does worse in most

124

Id.
Id. at 591.
126 See infra Section IV.B.1 for a discussion of why insured patients should sue and how doctrine could
incentivize providers to disclose rates ex ante.
127 Without universal health care, there will always be patients who receive care they cannot pay for, but
as section I.D.2 describes, lack of cost information exacerbates these problems.
125
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measures of quality compared to peer countries.128 Although some dispute the
magnitude of the problem, few would argue that spending more for lower
quality is a winning equation.129 Health economists and policymakers have
myriad theories for why the U.S. health-care market is so flawed.130 One
contributing factor that has generated a lot of attention, particularly in recent
decades, is that insured patients have little incentive to make cost-conscious
decisions because, to some extent, they are not spending their own money.
Their monthly premiums are a sunk cost and they spend little out-of-pocket (at
least historically) for the care they consume. Consumer-driven health care,
which is an umbrella term referring to methods to make patients act more like
traditional consumers entrusted with decision-making power, has emerged as a
key industry solution.131 As Republicans look to “repeal and replace” the ACA,
consumer-driven health care is certain to grow in importance.132
Prior to the advent of health insurance, patients who sought medical care
paid providers directly on a fee-for-service basis. Health insurance, largely a
product of the middle to late twentieth century, changed the model.133 Both
128 155 CONG. REC. S11132-05 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2009) (statement of Sen. Hagan) (“[T]he United States
spends $2.3 trillion each year on health care—the most per capita of all industrialized nations. Yet we still
have higher infant mortality and lower life expectancy than many of the other industrialized nations.”). Some
have argued that health care costs more in the United States because we are a wealthier country and are buying
better quality, but data should disabuse us of that notion. See Adam Candeub, Contract, Warranty, and the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 51 (2011) (“There is little to no
data linking total health care expenditures with positive health care outcomes . . . .”).
129 See generally David Squires & Chloe Anderson, U.S. Health Care from a Global Perspective:
Spending, Use of Services, Prices, and Health in 13 Countries, COMMONWEALTH FUND, Oct. 2015,
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2015/oct/1819_squires_us_hlt_
care_global_perspective_oecd_intl_brief_v3.pdf. The New England Institute of Health estimates nearly 30%
of health care spending is due to overuse. JULES DELAUNE & WENDY EVERETT, NEW ENGLAND HEALTHCARE
INST., WASTE & INEFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 23 (2008), http://www.nehi.net/writable/
publication_files/file/waste_clinical_care_report_final.pdf; see also Eve A. Kerr & John Z. Ayanian, How to
Stop the Overconsumption of Health Care, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 11, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/how-tostop-the-overconsumption-of-health-care (“[U]nnecessary, even harmful, services . . . represent about 10% of
all U.S. health care spending—nearly $300 billion a year.”).
130 See generally Uwe Reinhardt, The Many Different Prices Paid to Providers and the Flawed Theory of
Cost Shifting: Is It Time for a More Rational All-Payer System?, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2125, 2127 (2011)
(discussing market imperfections in the health care market).
131 See, e.g., Hall, supra note 43, at 586–87; James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven
Health Care: Promise and Performance, 28 HEALTH AFF. 272, 272 (2009).
132 Timothy Jost, Examining the House Republican ACA Repeal and Replace Legislation, HEALTH AFF.
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2017/03/07/examining-the-house-republican-aca-repeal-andreplace-legislation/.
133 In 1940, less than 10% of the employed population had health insurance coverage. By 1955, that
number had increased to nearly 70%, and further grew in the 1960s with the enactment of Medicare and
Medicaid. See PETER R. KONGSTVEDT, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGED HEALTH CARE 5 (6th ed. 2013).
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traditional private health insurance and government-sponsored health benefits
were designed to cover most of the cost of an individual’s incremental health
care consumption. With private insurance, patients typically pay insurance
companies fixed monthly premiums. These premiums entitle patients to
coverage, which means that if they see a provider who is “in-network”—who
has entered into a contract with the insurer—the patient incurs no (or very
little) additional out-of-pocket expense for the care. These in-network
providers are reimbursed by the insurance company on a fee-for-service
basis134 and the insurance company in turn sets patient premiums to account
for the fees they pay to providers.135
Under this model, the purely economic incentives for physicians are to
deliver as much high cost care as possible, increasing their personal
compensation. Patients have little incentive to turn down costly care because
their insurance premiums are a sunk cost, and they pay little to nothing for the
office visits and treatments they receive that are covered by insurance. As a
result, rational consumers purchase far more than the efficient level of health
care services. This is often referred to as moral hazard.136
Unsurprisingly, these incentives have created an over-utilization problem in
the United States.137 Americans consume too much care known to provide
minimal clinical benefit.138 According to the Institute of Medicine,
overtreatment—too many tests and too many procedures that do not improve
health—is costing the United States at least $210 billion per year.139
134 For private insurers, the fee schedule is negotiated between the provider and the insured. Government
insurers (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid) set payment rates for providers who agree to see those patients. See
Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Healthcare, HARV. BUS. REV.,
June 2004, at 1, 5.
135 Individual health care expenditures make premiums higher, but one individual’s behavior does little to
effect premium prices, so there is a collective action problem. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel,
Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 144–50 (2010)
(describing the collective action problem in health care).
136 See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care
Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 939 (2013). Although the insurer still negotiates rates.
137 The tax laws also help to create an environment where patients spend more on health care than might
be efficient. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health
Care, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 36 (2006).
138 See, e.g., Aaron L. Schwartz et al., Measuring Low-Value Care in Medicare, 174 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 1067 (2014) (discussing a study of Medicare claims data that found that in a single year, 42% of
Medicare beneficiaries had received care known to provide minimal clinical benefit).
139 See Annie Lowrey, Study of U.S. Health Care System Finds Both Waste and Opportunity to Improve,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/health/policy/waste-and-promise-seen-inus-health-care-system.html. Notably, those without insurance probably consume too little care. Id.
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“Consumerism” has become a buzzword for free market aficionados.140
The premise is basic economics: a patient who must spend more of his or her
own money (rather than the insurance company’s money)141 should consume
less care, particularly if it is unnecessary care.142
There are several ways to make patients act more like consumers in the
economic sense. The first is to increase patient cost-sharing obligations
through adding copays and co-insurance.143 Both create an incremental cost to
patients of consuming care. In theory, if a patient really needs to see a doctor,
the patient will be willing to incur the cost, but if the office visit may not be
necessary, the patient may hold off.144
The second way to make a patient act more like a consumer is by
increasing deductibles, which are the amount a patient has to pay out-of-pocket
before insurance benefits kick in.145 Patients with high deductibles should be
more cost conscious. Essentially, high deductibles make patients act more like
uninsured patients until the deductible is met.146
A famous experiment conducted between November 1974 and January
1982—the RAND Health Insurance Experiment—provided support for the
theory that increasing patient cost-sharing reduces health care spending.147 The
140

Hall, supra note 43, at 586 (noting that consumer-driven principles have been discussed as early as the

1930s).
141

See id. (describing the consumer-directed health-care movement); Robertson, supra note 136, at 946
(describing giving patients more “skin in the game” to deter costly consumption).
142 See, e.g., CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS INSTRUMENTS OF
HEALTH REFORM (1995). Lindsay F. Wiley notes that consumerism can reframe the health care market to a
patients’ rights model. Lindsay F. Wiley, From Patient Rights to Health Justice: Securing the Public’s Interest
in Affordable, High-Quality Health Care, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 833, 851 (2016).
143 Coinsurance is the “percentage of costs of a covered health care service you pay (20%, for example)
after you’ve paid your deductible.” Coinsurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/coinsurance/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
144 One criticism of the consumerism model is the reliance it yields to patients to make these sorts of
decisions when patients generally are not well-educated in medical decision making.
145 Ifrad Islam, Trouble Ahead for High Deductible Health Plans?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/07/trouble-ahead-for-high-deductible-health-plans/
(“[O]ne
motor
driving cost control opportunity in high deductible plans is the empowerment of patients to make better
choices about the medical care they seek.”).
146 A third, and most extreme option, is to take insurance out of the equation entirely. Uninsured patients
are the most cost conscious of all. But this extreme choice prices many out of health care and is really at the
fringe of what would be considered consumer-driven health care. See, e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Is Health
Insurance a Bad Idea? The Consumer-Driven Perspective, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 377, 379–80 (2008).
147 See Robert H. Brook et al., RAND Corp., The Health Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study
Speaks to the Current Health Care Reform Debate 1, RAND HEALTH (2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB9174.html.
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study randomly assigned about 2,750 families in six U.S. cities to insurance
plans with varying amounts of patient cost sharing.148 It sought to assess
whether cost sharing influenced overall spending and what the correlation was
with health outcomes. It found that high deductible plans with high cost
sharing led to much lower average spending—on average 25% to 30% less—
than plans with no out-of-pocket expenses aside from the premiums.149 In
general, health outcomes were similar despite differences in health spending.150
The consumer-driven health-care movement first gained serious
momentum with the passage of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003.151 The Act provides tax incentives to those
who enroll in consumer-driven health plans. So-called Consumer Driven
Health Plans (CDHPs), which have dual features of a high deductible paired
with a health savings account (HSA), grew exponentially with the passage of
the law.152 Proponents of these plans argued that the use of HSAs—which are
consumer-controlled accounts and not fixed health insurance benefits—would
ultimately foster market competition, which would in turn lower health care
prices and stimulate improvements in service.153
Critics were concerned, however, that less wealthy and less educated
patients would suffer under the new model. Less wealthy patients might avoid
necessary health care because of the cost burden. And less educated patients
might lack the ability to make informed, appropriate choices.154 Even educated
patients may have difficulty evaluating high value care because of the
difficulty in obtaining quality data alongside pricing data. But even after the

148

Id.
Id. at 2.
150 A notable exception is that individuals of lower socioeconomic status saw greater improvements in
high blood pressure and vision care with lower cost-sharing. Id. at 3.
151 Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003); see also Wiley, supra note 142, at 851–52; Mark A. Hall
& Clark C. Havighurst, Reviving Managed Care with Health Savings Accounts, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1490, 1491
(2005); How Consumer-Directed Health Plans Work, UNIV. WASH., http://hr.uw.edu/benefits/healthinsurance/compare-plans/how-consumer-directed-health-plans-work/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
152 See 26 C.F.R. § 601.602 (Westlaw through 2017) (providing IRS definition of high-deductible plan);
26 U.S.C. § 223 (2006) (defining health savings account).
153 See Juliana Darrow, Opinion, Health Savings Accounts Essential to Build a Vibrant Healthcare
System, THE HILL (Mar. 10, 2017, 7:40 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/323279-healthsavings-accounts-essential-part-of-building-a-vibrant.
154 See Ubel et al., supra note 56, at 654.
149
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ACA put some limits on these plans,155 they have grown exponentially in
popularity.156
A 2015 survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that in the
employer-provided insurance market, almost one quarter of workers are now
enrolled in a HDHP, up from 4% in 2006.157 That number is even higher—
almost 50%—for workers whose insurance plans have a general annual
deductible of at least $1,000 for individual coverage.158 In general, deductibles
in employer-sponsored plans have increased 67% since 2010.159 In the
individual market, almost 90% of enrollees in a marketplace plan have a
deductible above the level necessary to qualify as a HDHP.160
If one thing is clear, it is that techniques to make patients act more like
consumers in making medical decisions are taking over the marketplace.161
Even before repeal of the ACA became a policy focus, Professor Mark Hall
called consumer-driven health care “the emerging centerpiece of health care
policy.”162 It means that now even insured patients have reason to care about
health care prices.

155 See 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012); Out-of-Pocket Maximum/Limit, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.
healthcare.gov/glossary/out-of-pocket-maximum-limit/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
156 Pat Tiberi, Consumer Directed Health Plans with HSAs Are Growing in Popularity, U.S. CONGRESS:
JOINT ECON. COMMITTEE (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2017/3/
consumer-directed-health-plans-with-hsas-are-growing-in-popularity. Notably, even if you are a skeptic of
consumer-driven health care, as many are, there are other very good reasons to want price transparency in the
health care market. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 104.
157 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TR., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2015
ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-2015-employer-health-benefits-survey
[hereinafter KAISER FAMILY FOUND.].
158 Id. at 118. (“Over the last five years, the percentage of covered workers with a general annual
deductible of $1,000 or more for single coverage has grown substantially, increasing from 27% to 46%.”);
Dolan, supra note 10.
159 KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 157, at 4.
160 Dolan, supra note 10, at 1.
161 Id.
162 Hall, supra note 43, at 587; see also HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 9; National Health
Expenditures Data: Historical, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statisticstrends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealthaccountshistorical.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2017)
(noting United States health care spending rose by 5.8% in 2015).
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B. Market-Based Reform Solutions Fail If Patients Do Not Know Prices
For consumer-driven market reform mechanisms to work, patients must
know how much a procedure will cost before they consent to it.163 They must
be able to perform the cost-benefit analysis that cost-sharing presumes. More
globally, price transparency is required if market competition is going to force
improvements in the value of care offered. Perhaps not surprisingly, improving
price transparency has been listed in almost every major expert’s plan to
reduce health costs—across the political spectrum.164
There are two ways in which larger patient cost-sharing obligations may
reduce health-care costs. Patients may turn down unnecessary care, or they
may price shop for better value165 care.
Many studies have now found that patients with larger cost-sharing
obligations or higher deductibles do reduce the amount of health care they
consume166 and do change their care habits in ways that reduce expenditures.
For instance, patients reduce their use of brand name prescription drugs and
visit the emergency room less frequently.167

163 Christopher T. Robertson & David V. Yokum, Cost Sharing as Choice Architecture, in NUDGING
HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, at 146, 146–48 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds. 2016).
164 Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce Healthcare
Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 319, 320 (2013) (citing Ezekiel Emanuel et al., A Systemic Approach
to Containing Healthcare Spending, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/
10.1056/NEJMsb1205901 (“In August 2012, several of the nation’s top healthcare experts who helped write
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) included ‘price transparency’ in an eleven-point plan to reduce health
costs.”)); see supra note 11; see also Judith H. Hibbard et al., An Experiment Shows That a Well-Designed
Report on Costs and Quality Can Help Consumers Choose High-Value Health Care, 31 HEALTH AFF. 560
(2012).
165 The term “value” is defined to mean health outcomes achieved per dollar spent and hence reflects cost
relative to quality. See Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2447, 2447
(2010).
166 Dolan, supra note 10, at 3; Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Cost-Sharing Obligations, High-Deductible Health
Plan Growth, and Shopping for Health Care: Enrollees with Skin the Game, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 395,
395 (2016); Amelia M. Haviland et al., Do “Consumer-Directed” Health Plans Bend the Cost Curve Over
Time? 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21031, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/
w21031.pdf. But see Michael Hiltzik, The Myth of “Consumer-Driven Healthcare” Comes to Life Again, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-myth-of-consumerdirected-healthcare-20151214-column.html.
167 PAUL FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., WHAT DO WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT CONSUMERDRIVEN HEALTH PLANS? 22 (2010), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/ebri_ib_08-2010_no345_cdhps.pdf
(discussing a study finding that emergency room use declined under higher deductibles); Sinaiko et al., supra
note 166, at 395 (finding that high deductible plans are associated with lower health care spending).
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Consider the patient with clinically stable cancer who is asked to decide
between a positron emission tomography (PET) scan ($6,000) and whole-body
computerized tomography (CT) imaging ($1,000). The PET scan offers modest
added accuracy. A patient responsible for 20% of the cost would have to pay
an extra $1,000 out of pocket for the PET scan and may choose to go with the
probably just as good CT scan instead.168 Cost data may be particularly
impactful in the area of preference-sensitive care, where clinical evidence does
not clearly support one treatment option and patients are typically asked to
decide treatment based on personal values.
More data is needed to assess the role that price transparency specifically
plays in patient treatment choices.169 It makes intuitive sense that knowing the
(high) cost of a test or procedure makes it even more likely that a patient will
opt out of the procedure if it is not really necessary. Studies have found that
CDHPs reduce care consumption, but some show that reductions in use are
relatively low magnitude.170 Perhaps reduction in unnecessary care would be
even more apparent paired with price transparency.
Nonetheless, there are concerns. With more price transparency, patients
might turn down necessary care because of cost.171 The preliminary evidence
on this point is mixed. Some studies that have looked at health status
implications of higher cost-sharing have found that health status is, for the
most part, not affected, suggesting that necessary care continues to be
delivered.172 Others have, however, noted an adverse impact on low-income
patients and those with chronic conditions.173 If price information is provided

168 This hypothetical is based on Peter Ubel’s depiction of Rosemary Myers’s cancer treatment story. See
Ubel, supra note 12.
169 For a start, see Ethan M.J. Lieber, Does It Pay to Know Prices in Health Care?, 9 AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL’Y 154, 154–55 (2017) (showing that price transparency reduced average prices paid for health care).
170 See generally J. Frank Wharam et al., Emergency Department Use and Subsequent Hospitalizations
Among Members of a High-Deductible Health Plan, 297 JAMA 1093 (2007).
171 This possibility is particularly problematic if low-income patients are disproportionately drawn to
high-deductible plans because of lower premium costs.
172 RACHEL EFFROS, RAND CORP., INCREASE COST-PARTICIPATION BY EMPLOYEES (E.G., THROUGH
HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH PLANS) (2009), https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR562z4.html
(finding that HDHPs reduce effective and less effective care, but with no measurable impact on health status
for most patients).
173 See, e.g., Amitabh Chandra et al., The Impact of Patient Cost-Sharing on Low-Income Populations:
Evidence from Massachusetts, 33 J. HEALTH ECON. 57, 57–58 (2014) (finding that some low-income patients
subject to higher cost-sharing cut back on use entirely). In general, there are difficulties associated with
counting on patients to make medical decisions that are in their own best interests. See, e.g., Wendy Netter
Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2) (on file
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and comparative quality information is unavailable, there is a risk that patients
will over-emphasize price in the decision calculus. In other words,
policymakers would not want patients to make decisions based solely on price.
These concerns are real and deserve additional study. Indeed, the problem
of how to provide patients with salient quality data is already receiving much
attention from policymakers, and progress is being made.174 But a key piece of
the consumer-driven argument is that patients have not been cost-sensitive
because of moral hazard, and making them bear more cost will prompt patients
to turn down unnecessary care. If patients do not know cost, that simply will
not happen.175
Experts also believe that patients who have pricing information will be able
to shop around to find higher-value (lower-cost and higher-quality) care.
Preliminary data also supports this hypothesis. For instance, a recent study
found that patients who researched (and obtained) pricing information spent
less on average on their care than those who did not.176
There is much concern among policymakers that this point is overstated
because patients are not price sensitive when it comes to health care.177 At least
some evidence, however, seems to counsel otherwise. We know that patients
do “shop” for the price of health-care procedures because they become medical
tourists, jumping through major hurdles to travel to other countries to have
procedures at a lower cost than they could have those procedures in the United
States.178

with author); Ubel et al., supra note 56, at 660 (noting that there needs to be a happy medium between patient
decision and physician engagement).
174 See, e.g., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS QUALITY STRATEGY (2016),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/
Downloads/CMS-Quality-Strategy.pdf; Physician Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/
physiciancompare/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2017).
175 See Peter A. Ubel et al., supra note 56, at 655.
176 Christopher Whaley et al., Association Between Availability of Health Service Prices and Payments for
These Services, 312 JAMA 1670, 1674–75 (2014); see also Andrew M. Seaman, Knowing Prices Tied to
Lower Healthcare Spending, REUTERS, Oct. 23, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcare-costsspending-idUSKCN0IC2K420141023 (discussing Whaley et al.’s research).
177 Some data supports this concern. See, e.g., Jason Shafrin, Is Health Care Demand Elastic?,
HEALTHCARE ECONOMIST (July 22, 2009), http://healthcare-economist.com/2009/07/22/is-health-care-demandelastic/.
178 See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the PatientProtective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1472–73 (2010) (“For U.S. patients, medical tourism promises
significant cost savings.”); I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of International
Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 269 (2013) (noting patients travel internationally for
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The cosmetic surgery market provides an interesting data point as well.
Cosmetic procedures are only provided to those who can pay. In contrast to the
rest of the health-care market, prices are typically provided in advance. The
market for cosmetic surgery seems to function much more as a typical
economic market than the market for the rest of health care. From 1992
through 2001, the consumer price index rose 26%, and in comparison, costs for
medical services rose 47%. Costs for cosmetic surgery increased only 16%.179
While there may be many other reasons that costs have risen more slowly,
including the elective nature of cosmetic surgery, it at least suggests that there
is price pressure in a market with price transparency.180
Another concern is that price transparency will not prompt comparison
shopping because quality data is hard to obtain and patients may equate higher
prices with higher quality.181 Again, evidence is somewhat mixed. But at least
some studies, including a recent Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and Public
Agenda survey, found that patients do not correlate high prices with better
medical care.182
Price transparency is not only a necessary component in influencing
individual patient behavior. Market reform proponents also look to
transparency to improve the health-care market more generally.183 In other
words, even if price transparency does not affect the choices of each individual
patient, improving price transparency should produce a public good in bringing
prices down to competitive levels.184

treatment). Much is unknown about price sensitivity. It may be that the stage IV cancer patient is not terribly
price sensitive, but those consenting to either elective or more routine procedures would be.
179 Kenneth T. Bowden, Determining a Reasonable Price for Health Care in the United States: Is This
Possible?, 34 BRIEF 26, 27 (2005); see also Devon Herrick, Why Health Costs Are Still Rising, NAT’L CTR.
POL’Y ANALYSIS (Nov. 18, 2010), www.ncpa.org/pub/ba731.
180 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5; Mark J. Perry, What Economic Lessons About Medical Costs
Can We Learn from the Market for Cosmetic Procedures?, AEIDEAS (Mar. 12, 2016, 9:37 AM), https://www.
aei.org/publication/what-economic-lessons-about-medical-costs-can-we-learn-from-the-market-for-cosmeticprocedures/.
181 See Marina N. Bolotnikova, The Changing Consensus on Healthcare Cost-Sharing, HARV. MAG.
(May 4, 2016), http://harvardmagazine.com/2016/05/harvard-medical-study-price-comparison-health-careprices (noting that “[p]atients may also be skeptical of lower-cost care, (even though research has shown little
relationship between cost and quality),” but nonetheless calling price transparency a “piece of the puzzle”); see
also Sunita Desai et al., Association Between Availability of a Price Transparency Tool and Outpatient
Spending, 315 JAMA 1874 (2016).
182 See PUB. AGENDA, HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?: HOW AMERICANS USE PRICES IN HEALTH CARE 2,
(2015), http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/how-much-will-it-cost.
183 Richman et al., supra note 62.
184 Id.
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Currently, there is a vast pricing spectrum in the American health-care
market that does not clearly correlate with quality differences (or with market
cost differentials).185 For instance, one study found that low-risk births could
range in cost from $1,189 to $11,986 just for the hospital facilities (hospital
room and supplies).186 More expensive cities do not necessarily have higher
health-care prices than less expensive ones.187 Part of the cause may be lack of
price transparency.188 Indeed, one study estimates that the system’s lack of
price transparency adds about $36 billion in system-wide costs each year.189
There is also a vast differential between rates charged to insured patients
and those charged to uninsured patients for the same procedures. This has been
flagged for years as a market failure that is highly problematic.190
Policymakers believe that price transparency has the possibility to remedy the
problem, at least in part.191 But the current model, in which providers have
only limited legislative pressure to make any sort of price disclosures,192 makes
it highly unlikely that market improvements will happen.

185 Zack Cooper et al., The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately
Insured, HEALTH CARE PRICING PROJECT 5, 11, 21 (2015), http://www.healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/
default/files/pricing_variation_manuscript_0.pdf.
186 Xiao Xu et al., Wide Variation Found in Hospital Facility Costs for Maternity Stays Involving LowRisk Childbirth, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1212, 1214 (2015).
187 See generally Alison Kodjak, That Surgery Might Cost You a Lot Less in Another Town, NPR (Apr.
27, 2016, 4:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/04/27/475880565/that-surgery-might-costyou-a-lot-less-in-another-town. In general, the health care market is flawed. Id.
188 See, e.g., Gail R. Wilensky, Consumer-Driven Health Plans: Early Evidence and Potential Impact on
Hospitals, 25 HEALTH AFF. 174, 176, 183–84 (2006). Note, however, that the biggest driver of price variations
may be the market power of the provider. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. MARTHA COAKLEY,
EXAMINATION OF HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS PURSUANT TO G.L. C. 118G, § 6½ (b) 1–5,
27, 43–44 (2010), http://www.mahp.com/assets/pdfs/attorney-general-report.pdf.
189 Bobbi Coluni, Save $36 Billion in U.S. Healthcare Spending Through Price Transparency, THOMSON
REUTERS 1–2 (Feb. 2012), http://64.64.16.103/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/thomsonreuters_savings_from_
price_transparency.pdf. Interestingly, this has not in itself spurred hospital disclosure of price.
190 Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Pricing and the Uninsured: Do the Uninsured Pay
Higher Prices?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 116, 119 (2008) (describing how uninsured patients pay higher prices than
insured patients).
191 The imbalance in power between providers and uninsured patients will, however, continue to exist
even if pricing is disclosed, and insurance companies will still be able to negotiate better rates than individuals.
It would be progress, however, if the gap could at least be narrowed.
192 Russ Mitchell, 29 States Get F on Disclosure Laws for Health Care Prices, NPR (Mar. 18, 2013, 4:26
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2013/03/18/174660050/29-states-get-f-on-disclosure-laws-forhealth-care-prices.
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C. Unexpected Medical Bills Contribute to High Personal Bankruptcy Rates
and Unrecoverable Hospital Debt
Other undesirable results follow from price opacity. Americans who
receive unexpected medical bills are more likely to file for bankruptcy, and
hospitals have heavy unrecoverable debt loads, increasing systemic costs.
An uninsured patient may receive an unexpected medical bill because she
is surprised by hospital chargemaster (or physician) rates.193 Insured patients
can also receive unexpected bills that they must pay. Balance billing, for
instance, occurs when a patient sees an out-of-network provider not bound to
the negotiated in-network billing rates.194 That out-of-network provider can,
generally speaking, bill the patient for the part of the total cost that the insurer
does not cover. For example, assume that the hospital bills $2,000, but the rate
that insurance pays is $800, and a patient’s plan only covers 50% of out-ofnetwork care. A patient might assume that insurance will pay $400 and the
patient will then owe $400. But really the patient will likely be billed $1,600
(which is $2,000 less the $400 that insurance paid). Patients often do not know
when they are receiving care from out-of-network physicians (e.g., an out-ofnetwork physician who assists on a surgery) and often do not know the
chargemaster rate before consenting.195
Some states have passed legislation that prevents some of these
practices.196 But balance billing is still quite common. “An estimated 1 in 3
American adults with private health insurance falls victim every two years to

193 See, e.g., Michael Winerip, Set Back by Recession, and Shut Out of Rebound, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/booming/for-laid-off-older-workers-age-bias-is-pervasive.html
(describing the case of a former corporate executive who lost his insurance upon job termination and incurred
over $171,000 in medical bills for a six-night hospital stay); see generally LIZ HAMEL ET AL., KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., THE BURDEN OF MEDICAL DEBT: RESULTS FROM THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION / NEW YORK TIMES
MEDICAL SURVEY, SECTION 1: WHO HAS MEDICAL BILL PROBLEMS AND WHAT ARE THE CONTRIBUTING
FACTORS (2016), http://kff.org/report-section/the-burden-of-medical-debt-section-1-who-has-medical-billproblems-and-what-are-the-contributing-factors/ (noting that 53% of uninsured have difficulty paying bills and
two-thirds of those report that the bills resulted from one-time or short-term medical expense).
194 Erin C. Fuse Brown, Resurrecting Health Care Rate Regulation, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 85, 125 (2015).
195 See Haley Sweetland Edwards, The Hidden Cost of “Surprise” Medical Bills, TIME (Mar. 3, 2016),
http://time.com/4246077/medical-bills-hidden-cost/; Elisabeth Rosenthal, After Surgery, Surprise $117,000
Medical Bill from Doctor He Didn’t Know, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/21/
us/drive-by-doctoring-surprise-medical-bills.html?_r=1.
196 New York recently enacted legislation protecting patients against “surprise billing” in emergency room
services. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 24 (McKinney 2015). Other states including California, Texas, and
Colorado have done the same, but problems persist. Olga Khazan, The Agony of Medical Bills, THE ATLANTIC
(May 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/05/the-agony-of-surprise-medical-bills/393785/.
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what are known, aptly, as ‘surprise medical bills,’ according to a 2015 survey
by Consumer Reports.”197
Insured patients may also be surprised by medical bills they receive for innetwork services that they must pay in full before meeting their (frequently
high) deductibles. While these bills reflect a negotiated rate for in-network
providers, many patients are still unaware of the impact of their highdeductible insurance plans. A 2014 study found that 63% of American adults
had received medical bills that cost more than they anticipated.198
Perhaps it is unsurprising that unpaid medical bills are the primary cause of
U.S. bankruptcies, outpacing credit-card bills or late mortgage payments.199 And
bankruptcy filers tend to be individuals who are insured and who are not
chronically disadvantaged. Many would be considered middle class by income
standards.200 Even outside of the bankruptcy context, there is much evidence of
medical indebtedness, including among insured patients.201
Patients who do not know the cost of medical procedures cannot make good
financial decisions about seeking that care before they experience the negative
impact of crushing medical bills. While some spending beyond means is
unavoidable in a system without universal health-care coverage, and some

197 Edwards, supra note 195. A related problem is that patients unintentionally receive a type of medical
device or drug that their insurance company does not cover—also resulting in an unanticipated, high bill. Id.
198 Christina Lamontagne, NerdWallet Health Study: Medical Debt Crisis Worsening Despite Policy
Advances, NERDWALLET (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/health/managing-medical-bills/
medical-bills-debt-crisis/.
199 Daniel A. Austin, Medical Debt as a Cause of Consumer Bankruptcy, 67 ME. L. REV. 1, 2, 21–22
(2014) (noting that medical debt is the predominant factor in 18% to 26% of all bankruptcies); see David U.
Himmelstein et al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF. W5–63, W566–67 (Feb. 2, 2005), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2005/02/02/hlthaff.w5.63.full.pdf+html,
David U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122
AM. J. MED. 741, 741, 744–45 (2009); Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical
Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 90–94 (2008). Note that this finding is not
without controversy. See, e.g., Megan McArdle, Opinion, The Myth of the Medical Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG
VIEW (Jan. 17, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-17/the-myth-of-themedical-bankruptcy.
200 Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An Alternative Account of
Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 552 (2006) (“Our study of bankruptcy filers,
however, reveals that it is common for people with health insurance to develop medical-related financial
problems.” (emphasis added)).
201 Id. at 553–54 (noting that several studies “have observed significant financial vulnerability and
medical indebtedness” among both insured and uninsured patients); KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAL DEBT AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE (2014), http://kff.org/privateinsurance/report/medical-debt-among-people-with-health-insurance/.
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patients would continue to make poor decisions even with disclosure,202 lack of
price transparency almost certainly exacerbates the problem.
Relatedly, when patients consent to care that they ultimately cannot afford,
they leave hospitals with high rates of unrecoverable debt. Uninsured patients
contribute to the problem, but co-pays and deductibles among insured patients
can also be a significant part of a hospital’s bad debt.203 In 2014, community
hospitals provided $42.8 billion in uncompensated care.204 Two-thirds of the
costs that hospitals bill to patients are not recovered.205
While there is some public funding to reimburse hospitals,206 the effect on
the overall system is still higher health-care costs. When patients consent to
procedures without knowing the price, a host of negative consequences follow,
from personal financial ramifications to larger systemic problems.
The next Part explains how these issues are really ones of incomplete
contracts. The vast incomplete-contracts literature, which addresses the
benefits and challenges of the strategic use of incompleteness in drafting,
should inform doctrinal choices. In health care, theory suggests that the use of
incomplete contracting mechanisms is likely a poor fit with systemic goals.
III. CONTRACT THEORY AND THE INCOMPLETE CONTRACTING PARADIGM
Open price term contracts are one type of a larger category of “incomplete
contracts.”207 Incomplete contracts—which range from those that are missing
material terms to those that do not anticipate contingencies or address possible

202

Epstein, supra note 173 (manuscript at 38); Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the
Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139,
160–61 (2006) (noting that information overload can result in poorer decision making); Peter Ubel, How Price
Transparency Could End Up Increasing Health-Care Costs, ATLANTIC (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.
com/health/archive/2013/04/how-price-transparency-could-end-up-increasing-health-care-costs/274534/
(arguing that patients will unreasonably equate higher costs with better quality).
203 Jacoby & Warren, supra note 200, at 553–54.
204 This number includes both their cost of bad debt and charity care. Uncompensated Hospital Care Cost
Fact Sheet, AM. HOSP. ASS’N 1, 2–3, (2016), http://www.aha.org/content/16/uncompensatedcarefactsheet.pdf.
205 Id.
206 TERESA A. COUGHLIN ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., UNCOMPENSATED CARE FOR THE UNINSURED
IN 2013: A DETAILED EXAMINATION (2014), http://kff.org/uninsured/report/uncompensated-care-for-theuninsured-in-2013-a-detailed-examination/.
207 See generally Scott, supra note 16, at 1643–45.
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future states of the world, among other categories—208 have been the focus of
intense scholarly inquiry over the last several decades.209
Scholars wonder what motivates incompleteness. A contract may be
unintentionally incomplete due to negligence or laziness,210 or a contract may
be intentionally incomplete.211 Perhaps the parties failed to agree to terms or
rationally assessed the costs in detailing the contract ex ante and chose not to
bear those costs.212 Better-informed parties may have chosen to leave a
contract incomplete for the purpose of withholding information from a lessinformed transacting partner,213 or parties may have left contracts incomplete
as a conscious choice to build relational capital.214
Just as scholars have queried why parties choose relative completeness or
incompleteness, they have also pondered when incompleteness is desirable and
when it is undesirable.215 Because the law gives incentives to parties in their
drafting choices, the difficult task of distinguishing good incompleteness from
bad incompleteness is particularly important to legal doctrine.
A. Theories of Incomplete Contracts
There are many variables that affect the efficiency and general desirability
of contractual incompleteness. The law and economics account focuses on
transaction costs.216 The behavioral science literature focuses on the effect of
drafting choices on party behavior and motivation.217 To a large extent, these

208 Id. at 1641 (“All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of the world and the capacities of
contracting parties to condition their future performance on each possible state are finite.”).
209 See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 92–94; Scott, supra note 16, at 1644–45.
210 See, e.g., Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the Interpretation of
Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71, 76 n.29 (2009) (“Of course, sloppiness is another cause of
ambiguous drafting.”).
211 Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 279,
280 (2006).
212 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 16, at 1642.
213 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 760 (1992).
214 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 20, at 300–02; Florian Herold, Contractual Incompleteness as a Signal of
Trust, 68 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 180, 181 (2010).
215 Epstein, supra note 20, at 300–02; Epstein, supra note 72, at 28; Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting
for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 451 (2009);
Scott, supra note 16, at 1644–45.
216 See Ayres & Gernter, supra note 213.
217 See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 590
(2001).
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literatures exist side by side, and very little attempt has been made to build
bridges between them.218
In the traditional law and economics account, “the complete contingent
contract that specifies the obligations of the parties in each possible future state
of the world” is the gold standard.219 More specifically, transaction costs
motivate the decision about how complete of a contract to draft. Parties must
expend resources to draft a contract. Drafting a more detailed contract
generally means spending more resources. But in the law and economics
depiction, a detailed contract dissuades parties from acting opportunistically
during contract performance, reduces the likelihood that litigation will ensue,
and reduces the cost of litigation if it does occur.220
Whether it is efficient to bear the cost of detailed drafting can be
determined by a cost-benefit analysis.221 When the cost of detailed drafting is
less than expected gains, detailed drafting is the efficient choice.222 In most
situations, this is assumed to be the case.223 There may be situations in which it
is costly to detail the contract because of how complicated the deal is or how
uncertain future states of the world are. Then, it may be more efficient to draft
a more incomplete contract. There may also be other reasons, such as
reputational sanctions224 or operating within a network225 that make litigation

218 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J.
541, 549 (2003).
219 George G. Triantis, The Efficiency of Vague Contract Terms: A Response to the Schwartz-Scott Theory
of UCC Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1065, 1068 (2002).
220 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 92–93.
221 Judge Richard Posner is the most prominent supporter of this view. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1–7 (1979); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 12–16 (4th ed. 1992); see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 92 (“Scholars have
primarily attributed incompleteness to the costs of contracting.”); Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences
and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 25 (2009) (noting that in the traditional view,
detailed drafting increases the certainty that the judiciary will get it right in litigation).
222 See, e.g., Keith J. Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An
Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126, 135 (1993) (noting that parties
incorporate the potential for future disputes into their contracting).
223 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 1135 (2001). For
two parties to reach an optimally efficient agreement, information asymmetries may need to be mitigated. See,
e.g., Eric H. Franklin, Mandating Precontractual Disclosure, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 553, 563 (2013).
224 Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete
Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 212–16 (2009).
225 See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 563 (2015).
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and opportunism unlikely, in which case there might be little reason to bear the
cost of contract specification.226
The law and economics account of incomplete contracts is based on certain
assumptions. For instance, given contractual ambiguity, it assumes parties will
act opportunistically in their own self-interests.227 In addition, it assumes that
detailed drafting prompts desirable compliance. However, the behavioral
literature has tested these assumptions and found that individual behavior often
deviates from the model.228
First, in terms of cognitive effects, there is solid evidence suggesting that
detailed drafting can prompt compliance.229 However, there is also evidence
that specification causes agents to focus on what is enumerated in the contract,
sacrificing the larger goals of the endeavor; for example, an agent might
comply with each item on a checklist with little regard for delivering an overall
quality service.230 Specification hampers the exercise of discretion, and, for
this reason, it is important to distinguish between situations in which simple
contractual compliance is the goal from those in which something more is
needed.231
Second, detail can sometimes motivate agents, but it can also signal distrust
and hamper cooperation and collaboration. Some studies have found that
specific, challenging goals make agents desire to perform better and exert
higher levels of effort.232 But many studies have also found that task specificity

226

Even so, parties may still choose to draft detailed governance documents. See id.
Deepak Malhotra & J. Keith Murnighan, The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal Trust, 47 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 534, 534–59 (2002).
228 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 284–86 (1979); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 39 (1980); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 457–58 (1981).
229 See, e.g., Erik A. Mooi & Mrinal Ghosh, Contract Specificity and Its Performance Implications, J.
MARKETING, Mar. 2010, at 105, 106; Kenneth H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in Interfirm
Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solutions, J. MARKETING, Oct. 2000, at 36, 48.
230 Eileen Y. Chou et al., The Goldilocks Contract: The Synergistic Benefits of Combining Structure and
Autonomy for Persistence, Creativity, and Cooperation, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 393, 397
(2017); see also Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as
Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707, 708, 711 (2002) (discussing the importance of lack
of specificity to increase trust); Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON.
REV. 1611, 1611 (2006).
231 Epstein, supra note 20, at 318.
232 See Gerard H. Seijts & Gary P. Latham, The Effect of Distal Learning, Outcome, and Proximal Goals
on a Moderately Complex Task, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 291, 302, 304 (2001).
227
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can signal distrust and crowd out rapport and cooperation.233 It can also
dampen an agent’s intrinsic desire to perform well.234 In particular, task
specification has been shown to decrease motivation when the task is
complex.235
Whereas the law and economics literature tends to favor completeness in
drafting,236 much of the behavioral literature touts the virtues of
incompleteness.237 But it does not necessarily consider the types of costs on
which the law and economics literature is so focused.
The next section attempts to synthesize these two seemingly disparate
literatures. It suggests an analytical tool to differentiate between situations
when contractual completeness is desired from when it is not.
B. An Analytical Framework for Judging Desirability of Completeness
Incompleteness exists on a spectrum. No contract can be entirely
incomplete or there would be nothing to enforce, and no contract can be
entirely complete because no two parties could ever fully anticipate every
future state of the world.238 Some agreements are better off being toward one
end of the spectrum or another. Drawing on the literature, I suggest a balancing
test of three factors to help courts determine if, in any particular set of
circumstances, more complete or incomplete contracting is desirable. This

233 See Eileen Y. Chou et al., The Relational Costs of Complete Contracts 4 (June 25, 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1872569 (noting that complete contracts can
discourage cooperation).
234 In a famous study testing the motivational effects of implicit versus explicit contracts, Fehr and
Gächter found that principals who chose the explicit contract lost on average nine tokens per contract,
compared to a profit of twenty-six tokens per implicit contract and that the difference was attributable to effort
levels. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, J. ECON.
PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 177; see also Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device:
Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997).
235 See Nicholas S. Argyres et al., Complementarity and Evolution of Contractual Provisions: An
Empirical Study of I.T. Services Contracts, 18 ORG. SCI. 3, 15 (2007).
236 Notably, however, prominent law and economics scholars have started to accept that different contexts
might merit different doctrinal treatment. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 75 (2014) (arguing for literalism in interpreting
contracts between two sophisticated parties and contextualism for contracts between novices); Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Contextualism in Contract Interpretation: Doctrine, Debate, and Beyond, 85 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. (2017) (compiling work).
237 Indeed, I have written before about circumstances in which relative incompleteness is likely to
engender better results than more complete drafting. See Epstein, supra 20, at 313.
238 Scott, supra note 211, at 280.
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Article suggests an analytical framework that accounts for both the law and
economics and behavioral sciences findings.
The first factor concerns transaction costs. When a party would incur only
low transaction costs to detail a contract, a court should be more likely to
require a detailed contract. When transaction costs for detailing would be high,
a court should be less apt to require a more complete contract. Transaction
costs will tend to be highest when the subject matter is particularly complex,
where the future is highly uncertain, or both. For instance, a simple sales
transaction for the sale of a widget would not be costly to detail. On the other
hand, a multi-year contract for innovation in which the product does not yet
exist would be much costlier to detail. All else being equal, when transaction
costs for detailing a contract are high, contractual completeness becomes less
desirable.
The second factor requires an assessment of information asymmetry. When
one party has ready access to information that the other party does not, often a
more efficient contract can be designed when the information is disclosed. This
factor does not necessarily consider the costs or incentives for the informationbearer to acquire the information. But, in general, when the more sophisticated
party is a repeat player and has access to better information than the less
sophisticated party, a more efficient contract will result when that information
is disclosed through more complete drafting.239 The typical example, here,
stems from the insurance context. Doctrine encourages sophisticated insurers
to share information about coverage with less sophisticated insureds.240 High
degrees of information asymmetry suggest more detailed contracts being
desirable.241
The third factor concerns the extent to which a deal requires trust and
cooperation to develop between the parties. Less complete contracts have been
shown to build relational capital.242 But context matters. For instance, for some
contracts, the main goal is compliance. Consider again the sale of the widget.
The parties expect that each will simply comply with the terms—for the seller
to sell the widget to the buyer at the agreed upon date and time for the agreed
239 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 97; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian
Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1999); Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer
Contracts: The Challenge That Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 723, 733 (2008).
240 See Epstein, supra note 20, at 323 (2014) (discussing the doctrine of contra proferentem—construe
against the drafter).
241 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 213, at 735–36.
242 See Chou et al., supra note 233, at 4.
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upon price. There is little need for trust to develop or for the parties to learn to
collaborate. Building relational capital is low priority. On the other hand, there
are some contracting situations in which developing trust and collaboration is
essential. Consider the outsourcing of ongoing services or the previously
mentioned example of contracts for joint innovation.243 When the development
of relational capital is, relatively speaking, important and relative contractual
incompleteness is likely to foster that development, courts would want to
tolerate incompleteness. But when simple compliance is the goal, courts would
want to prompt more complete drafting.
Together, these three factors—degree of transaction costs to detail, extent
of information asymmetry, and desirability of forming relational capital—form
an analytical tool that courts may employ to determine the desirability of
contractual completeness. Balancing these factors will result in clear answers
for many cases. Other cases will prove more difficult.
Anytime courts engage in balancing tests, there are costs associated, both in
the resources dedicated to the endeavor and in the possibility that the court will
get it wrong. This is the sort of task, however, that modern contract law, with
its focus on contextualism, has embraced. It is commonly expected that courts
will dive into the facts of a given case to get to the right result.244
In addition, there is some evidence that courts are doing at least a part of
this assessment already, even if not explicitly. Professor Robert Scott
conducted an empirical study of contemporary case law on indefinite
contracts.245 In a sample of eighty-nine cases in which a court was asked to
determine whether a contract was too indefinite to be enforced, courts enforced
the contracts in thirty-four cases and denied enforcement in fifty-five. Scott
hypothesized that courts enforcing agreements were following the more
modern U.C.C. approach, whereas those not enforcing were following the
more traditional common law rule.246 The data, however, did not confirm that
hypothesis.247

243 These are an update on the criteria that I introduced in past work. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 299–
313; Epstein, supra note 72, at 12.
244 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual Track Theory of Interpretation, 109
PENN. ST. L. REV. 397, 459–61 (2004) (discussing the emergence of contextual contract interpretation).
245 Scott, supra note 16, at 1643.
246 Id. at 1653.
247 Id. at 1643.
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Instead, Scott found something interesting. Courts seemed to focus on
whether the parties exploited verifiable information in drafting their
agreements.248 When an agreement was incomplete owing to high levels of
uncertainty ex ante, courts were more prone to fill gaps for the parties. But if
parties simply “appear to have discarded verifiable information that they might
have used at relatively low cost to condition performance, the courts decline to
enforce the agreement.”249 In other words, outside the health context, courts
seem to be engaging in a sort of analysis along the lines of the first factor
(concerning transaction costs to draft) suggested here.250 Courts should be able
to make the analysis they use more explicit so that parties receive the right
signals at the drafting stage. And courts should expand their analysis to be
consistent with the teachings of theory more broadly, as this section suggests.
But it can be done.
Indeed, examples in which incompleteness is desirable have previously
been explored. In contracts for innovation, intellectual property licensing, and
public-private contracting over complex government services, to name some,
transaction costs to draft are high, information asymmetry low, and there is a
great need for relational capital.251 There, less complete contracts are desirable.
The health-care example is, in many ways, opposite.
C. Doctrinal Approach to Incomplete Health Law Contracts Is Mismatched
with Theory
Current doctrine permits incomplete contracts between patients and
providers, but it is often a mismatch with theory. In most cases, courts should
require relative completeness, including as to price.
First, for most medical treatment, transaction costs incurred in providing a
fee ex ante are relatively low. This is not what traditional case law assumes.252
It assumes that it would be costly and difficult to provide ex ante pricing

248

Id. at 1654.
Id. at 1655.
250 Id. at 1659 (“In the cases falling within each of these prototypes, the courts appear most influenced by
the failure of the parties to agree on readily available, verifiable terms.”).
251 See Epstein, supra note 20, at 321–23.
252 See DiCarlo v. St. Mary’s Hosp., No. 05-1665 (DRD-SDW), 2006 WL 2038498, at *4 (D.N.J. July 19,
2006); see also Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosps. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 193 (S.D. 2007) (quoting
Cox v. Athens Reg’l Med. Ctr., 631 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)).
249
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because of uncertainty.253 While certain aspects of medical care may indeed be
uncertain, the traditional concerns are over-stated as to modern medicine.
Today, providers usually know in advance what code will be used to charge
the patient (e.g., for an office visit, an x-ray, a flu shot, etc.).254 For the
uninsured patient, the provider need only access the hospital chargemaster (or
physician price list) to then determine the price. For the in-network insured
patient, the provider must query the rate the provider has negotiated for the
procedure.255 For the government-insured patient, the provider must determine
the rate set by the government for the procedure.256
A degree of complexity is potentially introduced depending on what the
treatment is. For instance, it might be more difficult to provide a price for the
patient who was hit by a car who arrives at an emergency room with multiple
injuries or for the oncology surgery in which the surgeon really will not know
the extent to which the cancer has spread until she opens up the patient257 than
for the patient who requires a routine flu shot or a routine diagnostic test like
an x-ray.
But it would be wrong to assume that all or even the majority of health care
falls into the category of being highly complex and difficult to predict.
Emergency-room care accounts for a very small proportion of health care
expenditures—as little as 2% of expenditures by some measures.258 And while
253 See DiCarlo, 2006 WL 2038498, at *4; see also Nygaard, 731 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Cox v. Athens
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 631 S.E.2d 792, 797 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (stating “in a hospital setting, it is not possible to
know at the outset what the cost of the treatment will be, because it is not known what treatment will be
medically necessary”).
254 Indeed, trade associations, medical device companies, and others, spend much time educating
physicians on what coding choices will maximize their compensation. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Neurological
Surgeons, Managing Coding & Reimbursement Challenges in Neurosurgery (2015), http://www.aans.org/pdf/
Education%20and%20Meetings/2015%20Managing%20Coding%20Brochure.pdf; Reimbursement: Directory
of Resources, MEDTRONIC, http://www.medtronic.com/us-en/healthcare-professionals/reimbursement.html
(last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
255 Riggs & Ubel, supra note 65.
256 This may be an over-simplification of the functioning of hospital billing systems, which are,
admittedly, not particularly efficient and effective. But one could easily imagine a system set up to work this
way.
257 It is costlier to provide a price or price range for complex surgery, but that is not to say that it could not
be priced. It would require a complex flow chart of potential complications, but there are only so many
complications that are really a possibility, and those are already detailed in the informed consent documents.
258 The Fiscal Times, Emergency Room Costs Have Skyrocketed to as Much as $151 Billion, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/er-costs-skyrocketed-to-151-billion-20134; Louis Jacobson, Does Emergency Care Account for Just 2 Percent of All Health Spending?, POLITIFACT
(Oct. 28, 2013, 10:58 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/oct/28/nick-gillespie/
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some surgeries are unpredictable and uncertain, many have become more
routinized over time and will only continue to be more so. Between the flu shot
and the cancer surgery lies a lot of other medical care. For most of it, providers
should be able to determine a price or at least a small range for the price prior
to the patient undergoing the treatment, and incur little cost for doing so.259 An
office visit usually has a standard charge. There is little uncertainty in the cost
of a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) or a CT scan or a mammogram. And
the list goes on.
The second factor to consider is the extent of information asymmetry. Here,
the provider clearly has better access to pricing information than the patient.260
Providers know what codes they will use to bill for their services.261 And
providers are the ones that have either set the rates (uninsured patients),
negotiated the rates (privately insured patients), or been informed of the rates
(publicly insured patients). While patients do have some options—for instance,
they can call their insurance companies and get a sense of cost for various
procedures—providers are undoubtedly better situated to do so.262 Providers
are the repeat players, here, with far better and less costly access to information
than patients do.
As to the last factor, in most instances, there seems to be limited potential
that leaving out a price term will serve to build positive relational capital
between the provider and the patient. A provider’s refusal to state a price for an
x-ray is not going to make the patient trust the provider more or facilitate better
collaboration on the patient’s care the way that less task specification signals
does-emergency-care-account-just-2-percent-all-hea/; see also Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, DEP’T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2008), http://tinyurl.com/489fao6; Lee
et al., supra note 34 (describing emergency room costs between 5% and 6%, but as high as 10%).
259 Medicare Provider Utilization and Payment Data, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/ResearchStatistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare-Provider-Charge-Data/index.html (last
modified Aug. 10, 2017); Peter Ubel, If Costs Are Unknown, Can Doctors Still Talk About Them?, FORBES
(June 17, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2014/06/17/if-costs-are-unknown-candoctors-still-talk-about-them/#6e4c22a63b6f. For a description of technological hurdles that would add to
transaction costs, however, see supra note 73.
260 See generally John Santa, Transparency in the Cost of Care, in THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE:
LOWERING COSTS AND IMPROVING OUTCOMES: WORKSHOP SERIES SUMMARY 377 (Pierre L. Yong et al. eds.,
2010).
261 Course 2: The Medical Billing Process, MED. BILLING & ONLINE CODING http://www.
medicalbillingandcodingonline.com/medical-coding-for-billers/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
262 Berry et al., supra note 86, at 46 (“The reasons vary, but in franchising situations, the relative
bargaining strengths of the parties often place one side at a disadvantage in contract negotiations. The resulting
power disparity often permits the stronger party to retain the right to set important terms, such as price, at a
future date.”).
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trust and a desire to collaborate in other settings. This is particularly true for
the parts of medicine in which compliance is the goal: do the diagnostic test,
give the vaccine, suture the wound, etc.
There is an argument to be made that keeping discussions of cost out of
patient-provider communications does build relational capital, particularly
when it comes to long-term relationships involving chronic disease. Bringing
cost into the discussion can turn the relationship into one more characterized
by its business characteristics than a more traditional doctor-patient
relationship. Doctors tend to view their jobs as providing sound medical advice
without concern for price.263 On the other hand, one could imagine that a
doctor-patient relationship built on trust could suffer if patients feel they are
not being given critical information to make decisions about treatment—like
cost.
The balancing test may yield a different result depending on the
circumstances of any individual case. But it is unlikely that balancing the
factors in the case of a patient seeking an x-ray would ever result in a finding
that the contract should be incomplete as to price. The transaction costs a
provider would have to bear to provide the fee should be low. Information
asymmetry is high. And the goal is simply to take the image—in other words,
compliance with the task rather than more complicated relationship building
between the patient and the provider. On the other hand, one could imagine a
complex and unpredictable procedure, in which information asymmetry may
still be high, but there is a significant need to develop a strong, long-term
collaborating relationship between the provider and the patient. There, a court
could find that a level of incompleteness—including leaving out the price in
the contract—is the efficient course.
Although these are not always easy lines to draw, courts are experienced at
applying balancing tests.264 In doing so, courts should be able to determine
whether a more detailed or less detailed contract is merited and send the right
signals to future parties engaged in similar drafting exercises.

263 Peter A. Ubel, Opinion, Doctor, First Tell Me What It Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/11/04/opinion/doctor-first-tell-me-what-it-costs.html?mcubz=1; Ubel, supra note 259.
264 And in most situations, parties should be able to view the criteria and get the signal for what end of the
spectrum their deal falls on.
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The next Part offers a solution to the doctrine-theory mismatch evident in
the health care example—a solution that may also be applicable to other areas
where courts should be incentivizing completeness in contract drafting.
IV. THE PENALTY DEFAULT RULE SOLUTION TO THE PRICE TRANSPARENCY
PROBLEM
Courts have a doctrinal tool at the ready to prompt providers to include a
price term in at least most of their contracts: the penalty default rule. The
problem has been that when the price term is left open, courts enforce the
contract and fill the open term with a reasonable price. For uninsured patients,
courts have held that the chargemaster prices are “reasonable,” and for insured
patients, the negotiated rates are reasonable.265 Under this scheme, there is
little incentive for providers to disclose price and no way for patients to change
their behaviors in consideration of price.
Various solutions to this problem have been proposed, from legislative to
private solutions to solutions based in tort law. But the current approaches are
all flawed. Contract law provides a yet unexplored option—one that can be
implemented simply by a change to the common law. This Part explains how
penalty default rules work and how a penalty default could be employed in
health care.
A. How Penalty Default Rules Work
Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner were the first to describe the
concept of a penalty default.266 They observed that high transaction costs do
not always explain why parties draft incomplete contracts.267 Rather,
sometimes contracts are incomplete because one party strategically withholds
information from the other party, which reduces the efficiency of the deal.268
They suggested that lawmakers should reduce this rent-seeking, strategic
behavior that leads to inefficient contracts by “sometimes choos[ing] penalty
defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal information by contracting
around the default penalty.”269

265

See, e.g., Queen’s Med. Ctr. v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1149–50 (D.
Haw. 2013); Allen v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 980 N.E.2d 306, 310–11 (Ind. 2012).
266 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 94.
267 Id. at 92–93.
268 Id. at 94.
269 Id.
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Penalty defaults force the sharing of information by selecting a gap-filler
term that is undesirable to the party that is strategically withholding the
information.270 As Ayres and Gertner describe: “[P]enalty defaults are
purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in order to encourage the
parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties (especially the
courts).”271
“[P]enalty defaults ‘operate on precontractual behavior’ because it is the
potential contractors’ aversion to the default penalty that causes them to
change their contractual offers.”272 Two examples illustrate: U.C.C. § 2-201,
which requires that an agreement include a quantity term to be enforceable;273
and the contra proferentem rule,274 which requires ambiguous contract
provisions to be construed against the drafting party.275
The U.C.C. quantity rule (U.C.C. § 2-201) requires that a quantity be
specified in the contract for the contract to be enforceable.276 It essentially sets
a default quantity of zero. If the parties do not specify a quantity, the court will
not fill the gap with a reasonable quantity. Instead, the court will find the
contract to be invalid.277
This zero-quantity rule sends a message to contracting parties: specify a
quantity term or you have no contract. In this sense, it is an informationforcing rule. It does not try to fill the gap with what parties would have agreed
to at the time of contracting, which is the most common approach to gap-filling
in contracts. Rather, it penalizes parties that do not come to agreement on
quantity. The effect of the penalty default is that parties are forced to contract

270

Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 91; see also Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh: There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 589, 594 (2006); Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
305 (2013) (explaining the penalty default theory).
272 Ayres, supra note 271, at 595.
273 U.C.C. § 2-201 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“[T]he contract is not enforceable
under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in [the] writing.”).
274 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); Epstein, supra note 20, at
323.
275 See Ayres, supra note 271, at 594; Ayres & Gertner, supra note 16, at 94. But see Eric A. Posner,
There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563 (2006).
276 U.C.C. § 2-201 cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (“The only term which must
appear is the quantity term which need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated.”).
277 This approach is in stark contrast to how the U.C.C. treats contracts for the sale of goods that lack a
price term, as discussed earlier, where courts are directed to fill the gap with a reasonable (market) price.
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around the default of zero quantity and no enforcement and instead include a
quantity term.278
Contra proferentem, or “construe against the drafter,” is, in many respects,
also intended to function as a penalty default.279 The rule tells courts to
construe ambiguous contract provisions against the drafting party.280 It is most
frequently applied in the insurance context to prevent insurers from purposely
using vague language to later argue for a favorable interpretation in
litigation.281 Because the drafting party usually has greater bargaining power
and is in a position to use clearer language, the rule penalizes parties that do
not heed the warning.282 Viewed from the vantage of drafting parties, the rule
is intended to incentivize drafters to use precise language.283 As these and other
examples illustrate,284 penalty defaults can be used more generally to force
parties to enter into more complete contracts when doing so would be efficient.
Part of the difficulty, however, comes in distinguishing situations in which
penalty defaults will work as intended from those where they will not. Much of
the scholarly criticism of penalty defaults discusses just this. For instance,
scholars have argued that parties will not always choose to contract around a
penalty default.285 This is particularly so when the cost of disclosing the
information is large and the likelihood of litigation is small.286 There, the
information-bearing party may choose to roll the dice and hope that the deal
does not end up in court rather than disclose the valuable information it
possesses.287
There are other related problems, as well. For instance, consider the
operation of contra proferentem in the insurance context. The consumer may
not read the contract even if it is more detailed—or perhaps because it is more
278

Ayres, supra note 272, at 609.
Id.
280 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
281 See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1105, 1107 (2006).
282 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (describing that the
rule is intended to prevent party with greater bargaining power from leaving term deliberately obscure).
283 Epstein, supra note 20, at 323–24.
284 For a long list of penalty defaults, see Ayres, supra note 272, at 598–607.
285 See, e.g., Avery W. Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 169, 175 (2005).
286 See, e.g., id.; Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default
Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 617 (1990); Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1589 (1999).
287 See, e.g., Ayres & Gernter, supra note 213, at 729.
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detailed—and thus the rule only adds transaction costs with no efficiency
gain.288 Indeed, the more sophisticated party may actually harm the less
sophisticated party in response to the penalty default by raising insurance rates
to cover the added cost (in litigation risk) that the default rule adds.289
Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Lisa Bernstein explore a related problem.
They argue that penalty defaults may be inefficient when they force the
disclosure of information that would reveal trade secrets valuable beyond the
single contract.290 Finally, Professor Eric Posner has been a vocal critic of
penalty defaults, arguing that the analysis required to determine whether a
penalty default is necessary is too complicated and indeterminate for judges to
use.291
The next section addresses these criticisms in exploring how a penalty
default would work in the health care context.
B. A Penalty Default Rule to Fix the Health Care Price Transparency
Problem
In most contracts between patients and providers, relative completeness in
drafting is desirable. Currently, however, most of these contracts are
incomplete in the sense of missing a material term—the price. The common
law enforces these contracts, even though theory suggests it should not.292
1. The Proposed Solution
Courts should find that, at least for low-complexity, relatively predictable
health care services, providers must include a price term. If providers leave a
contractual gap as to price, courts should fill the gap with a price of $0. If a
provider fails to include a price term, and the patient subsequently does not
pay, the provider will not be able to recover its rate by bringing a cause of

288
289
290

Boardman, supra note 271, at 330.
Id. at 329.
Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1885, 1886

(2000).
291

Posner, supra at 275, at 586.
Nygaard v. Sioux Valley Hosp. & Health Sys., 731 N.W.2d 184, 192 (S.D. 2007) (noting that “if the
charges are ascertainable through reference to outside sources, there is no need to judicially impute a fair and
reasonable price term”).
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action for breach of contract. Courts could implement this penalty default
simply with a change to the common law.293
If the penalty default works, providers will respond by including pricing in
their contracts where it is reasonable to do so. Now, providers require that
patients sign agreements stating the patient is responsible for whatever price
the provider later assesses.294 In reaction to a penalty default, that contract
would more than likely contain the price (or perhaps a range of prices when
appropriate).295
Courts, however, would only employ the penalty default when the
analytical framework set out in section III.B suggests that more complete
contracting is desirable. It is not a costless endeavor to ask courts to engage in
this exercise, but neither is it particularly complicated.296 This would exempt
from the pricing requirement emergencies (which are typically assessed under
principles of quasi-contract anyway) and particularly complicated and
unpredictable procedures. But for health care that is relatively predictable and
easy to price, courts would employ the $0 gap-filler.297
Consider the case of a patient who seeks medical attention after an injury.
His doctor strongly suspects a gastrocnemius muscle tear, so-called “tennis
leg,” but informs the patient that only MRI can definitively confirm the
diagnosis. With a penalty default rule, the hospital performing the MRI would
likely choose to include the cost of the test to the patient298 in the patient’s
contract, and the patient could then make an informed decision about whether
to incur the cost of the expensive MRI. The hospital would be well-advised to

293 See Hall, supra note 123, at 596 (suggesting that the law could be more demanding in requiring price
terms but that it would conflict with longstanding practices.).
294 See, e.g., Conditions of Admission, supra note 1.
295 Medicare’s MS-DRG system and private payers’ case-rate and per diem methodologies provide
examples. Both provide ways of scaling the rate to account for complications and comorbidities.
296 One possibility is that the penalty default could be supported by a regulatory framework to guide
courts on what procedures could generally be expected to be priced ex ante, and which ones could not be. Such
a mechanism would mitigate Eric Posner’s criticism of penalty defaults as being too indeterminate. See Posner,
supra note 275. But even without a regulatory framework, line-drawing difficulties seem to pale relative to the
huge costs of the status quo and in comparison to the potentially huge gains from prompting price
transparency.
297 Even without a supporting regulatory framework, if litigation sends appropriate signals, the market
should respond with price disclosure, lessening the burden on the courts.
298 This will require interaction between the hospital and the insurer, e.g., to ascertain how much of the
deductible the insured has already satisfied, how much co-insurance would cover, how much the patient will
owe, etc.
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provide the lower patient-specific cost that the insured patient will actually be
asked to pay—which requires checking insurance details.299
Again consider the example of the hypothetical patient, James, who must
undergo an angioplasty.300 James’s procedure is scheduled and non-emergent.
Under current practice, he would be presented a contract with no price and
required to sign. Under the penalty default regime, a rational, informed
provider would instead provide James with a contract that includes the price
term—and specifically, the amount that James will be asked to pay given
insurance benefits. If there is ambiguity as to what James will be charged
because of medical unknowns, the provider could at least be expected to
provide an estimate.301
There are potential issues with timing. If James schedules his procedure,
comes in ready to have it done, and is then first presented with the price,
disclosure of the price would likely be too late for James to engage in the costbenefit analysis that market proponents expect. He is already there and ready to
undergo the procedure. A better scenario would be if James’s physician
presents him with the contract before James schedules the procedure. This
would give James time to process the information and act accordingly. Once
the market reacts to the doctrinal change, market forces should dictate that cost
information be produced in patient-accessible forms at the salient time.
In addition to the timing issue, there are other potential concerns. One is
that the penalty default regime will mean higher prices for patients. Because it
is costlier for providers to put in place the administrative apparatus to provide a
price ex ante, providers will pass that extra cost onto consumers.302 However,
while it may be true that there is some additional cost to provide pricing ex
ante, the magnitude is probably not very high for most procedures. And
efficiency only requires that the savings from patients having access to cost
information exceed the additional cost to providers.

299 If a hospital merely includes the cost of the procedure without reference to how much the individual
patient will actually owe, the patient will be much more likely to opt out of the procedure in reaction to the
higher price. This argument does assume, however, some elasticity of demand for services. Market forces may
put less pressure on such disclosures, e.g., for later-stage cancers and other similarly serious ailments where
price tends to be a less motivating force for patients.
300 See supra INTRODUCTION.
301 Note that written estimate laws in other industries require exactly that. See, e.g., Automotive Repair
Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 306 § 15(b) (West 2016) (requiring a written estimate for labor and parts with final
bill not to exceed estimate by more than 10%).
302 See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 271, at 330.
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Alternatively, if price transparency succeeds in prompting patients to turn
down expensive care, physicians may have to raise prices to make up for the
lost revenue. However, if patients gain access to relevant quality information,
what will more likely happen is that the market will come to more accurately
price high-value care relative to low-value care.
Another concern is that the penalty default solution depends on providers
reacting to the penalty default and the threat of litigation by including a price
term in future contracts. Patients would have to sue to force a change in ex ante
provider practice.303 But instead of trying to avoid suit, providers could instead
raise their rates to cover the additional litigation costs and lost fees. While this
is a possibility, it is muted if the providers stand to lose more in litigation than
the cost of including the price term. It is true, though, that patients must
sufficiently test the system—refuse to pay and make the provider sue to try to
recover damages.304 Class actions, if not avoided by arbitration clauses, would
help.305
Another possibility is that instead of raising prices, providers may respond
to the new regime by providing worse treatment. If providers must commit to a
price in advance of a procedure, but it later turns out that the provider
estimated low, the provider may do less for the patient, recognizing that the
provider will only be paid the pre-agreed upon rate. For instance, if the doctor
and patient agree to a price of $2,000, but during treatment, it turns out that the
doctor really has to do $2,500 worth of work, the doctor may not provide full
treatment. Alternatively, doctors may estimate prices on the high side to
account for this possibility.
Negligence law would presumably address some of these concerns. In
addition, this is how other markets work, even for services, and there is no
reason to think that medicine is more problematic than building a house.
Moreover, we have not seen these effects in other priced markets, such as the
market for cosmetic surgery.306
303 One may be skeptical that patients will be informed enough or have enough resources to bring suit.
This is an area where the plaintiffs’ bar and patient advocacy groups could make a big difference.
304 This is similar to concerns about the medical malpractice system not working as intended because not
enough aggrieved patients can successfully sue. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 1–14
(2005); see also Scott Tenner, & Lillian Ringel, A Medical Complication Compensation Law: Improving
Quality Healthcare Delivery While Providing for Injury Compensation, 10 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 55,
58 (2014). Also, providers may employ other collection mechanisms with success on uninformed patients.
305 The penalty default would also need to be non-waivable.
306 HERRICK & GOODMAN, supra note 5.
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Additional concerns include that consumers will not read the contract and,
therefore, will not change their behavior because of price; or even informed
patients, for any number of reasons, will not price shop or they will turn down
unnecessary care.307 These are, of course, problems that could arise with any
price transparency regime.
Finally, the purpose of a penalty default rule, primarily, is to target precontractual behavior—to give the right incentives to the parties at the drafting
stage. When focusing on situations in which the penalty default is actually
applied in litigation, however, the result seems harsh. The hospital and doctors
who performed James’s angioplasty and who later sue to recover their fees
would not receive their $67,937. Courts may be tempted to order payment on
equitable grounds rather than for breach of contract. Perhaps this remedy
would be appropriate for a case that presents a close call, but for the penalty
default to function properly, and to send the right signals, some harsh results in
one-off cases would be necessary to change industry practices.
2. A Penalty Default Is Superior to, or Possibly a Necessary Complement
to, Alternatives
A penalty default rule is not the only option for addressing health care’s
price transparency problems. A multitude of other solutions have been
suggested or already implemented. While some of these solutions are
promising, none are without fault, and none have yet worked on their own to
solve the current price transparency dilemma. The most effective solution will
provide price information that is directly relevant to the patient’s decision.
Because averages, chargemaster rates, and usual and customary charges often
vary widely from what an individual patient will be expected to pay, many of
the current solutions are of limited utility. The contracts solution presents a
better option than existing solutions. It requires that a price be provided that is
relevant to the individual patient, and it offers a flexible vehicle that can
differentiate between situations when a price should be provided and when it
would be too costly and uncertain to require it. At the very least, it would serve
as an important complement to the price transparency solutions already in the
works.

307 Patients who cannot afford care but nonetheless need it will still consent to that care under this regime.
This is unavoidable in the current system.
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Current solutions meant to address price transparency include (1) statelevel legislation and all-payer claims databases, (2) federal legislation, and (3)
private insurer pricing mechanisms.
First, many states have now passed legislation meant to address price
transparency problems.308 Although each state has its own approach, in many
instances, the information that providers are required to disclose is not userfriendly or patient-specific.309 For example, most states list only average
prices, or even less helpfully, the chargemaster rates.310 Some states list only
in-patient rates.311
One clear trend has been that many states have mandated the creation of
all-payer claims databases (APCDs), which collect claims and payment
information from private and public payers. These databases have the potential
to compile very useful information, but that information is still not targeted to
the individual patient’s situation.
A common problem faced by legislative solutions is that industry players
push back on requirements to release pricing information because it is

308 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-125.05 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-301–07 (West 2011); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1339.55, .56, .58, .585 (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-20-101 (West
2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2001–2009 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (West Supp. 2017); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 2215/4-2(d)(6)&(7) (West 2015); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-21-6-1–3, 5–11 (West Supp.
2017); KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 216.2929 (West, Westlaw current through 2017 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 8701–12 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 228 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 62J.81–.83 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. §192.667 (West Supp. 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-2075
(West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439B.400 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-G:11 (Supp.
2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 131E-214.11–.14 (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3727.42–.44 (West
2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 442.405, .420, .425, .450, .460, .463 (West 2011); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 449.1–.19 (West Supp. 2017); 23 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-17.17-1–11 (West 2016); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12E-8, 11–13 (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 324.051, .101 (West
2017); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 26-33a-101–15 (West, Westlaw through Gen. Sess. 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 9410 (West Supp. 2016); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-276.2–.7 (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 70.41.250 (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§153.05, .08, .20–.22, .46, .50 (West 2016).
309 See generally CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM – HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST.,
REPORT CARD ON STATE TRANSPARENCY LAWS 8–17 (2014), http://www.hci3.org/wp-content/uploads/files/
files/Report_PriceTransLaws_2014.pdf (indicating that all but five states receive a failing grade on price
transparency laws).
310 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.55 (requiring hospitals to make public their
chargemaster prices); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1339.56 (requiring each hospital to compile a list of the
twenty-five most common outpatient procedures and their average charge); see also Hospital Chargemasters
and Charges for 25 Common Outpatient Procedures, CAL. OFF. STATEWIDE HEALTH PLANNING & DEV.,
http://www.oshpd.ca.gov/Chargemaster/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2017).
311 But see 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2215/4-2(d)(6)&(7) (requiring hospitals and surgery centers to
report costs of various outpatient procedures, as well as success rates).
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confidential312 or protected by trade secret.313 The contracts solution, however,
avoids these problems. It takes the information that was going to be provided
to patients anyway and moves it earlier in the process. It does not require
public reporting of negotiated rates between providers and insurers. It simply
changes the timing for the disclosure.
Second, the federal government has made some strides in addressing price
transparency, but its efforts suffer from many of the same problems as the state
efforts. For instance, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
recently released charge data for the 100 most common inpatient hospital
services and the thirty most common outpatient hospital services for more than
3,000 hospitals. Medicare now places on its website price comparisons for
similar brand name drugs used to treat common conditions. These new
requirements offer promise for patients, but strong enforcement has been
lacking, and patients are still not receiving information that is timely,
complete, and easy to understand.
Third, there have been private efforts. Insurance companies have started to
offer tools on their websites for their insureds to estimate the prices of
procedures.314 These tools are well-intended and offer some hope for the
future, but they still require that the patient understand the codes for which the
physician will ultimately bill. In addition, the calculators are not binding and
often inaccurate.315 Insurance companies should have the incentive to make
them accurate, but there nonetheless continue to be problems.
Many other suggestions have also been made.316 Notably, the concept of
requiring financial disclosure as a part of the informed consent process has
gained some steam.317 It would, however, be quite difficult for a patient to
312 See, e.g., CATALYST FOR PAYMENT REFORM, supra note 81, at app. 1, at 3–4 (discussing “gag clauses”
preventing providers from releasing insurer negotiated rates).
313 Id. at 4–5.
314 See, e.g., Calsyn, supra note 70 (discussing Aetna and Anthem policies).
315 Gordon, supra note 77.
316 See, e.g., Calsyn, supra note 70; E. Haavi Morreim, Consumer-Defined Health Plans: Emerging
Challenges from Tort and Contract, 39 J. HEALTH L. 307, 346–47 (2006) (suggesting changing state consumer
protection laws to require price disclosure).
317 See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Bargaining with Hippocrates: Managed Care and the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 54 S.C. L. REV. 689, 720–23 (2003); Richman et al., supra note 62, at 396; Meghan M.
Overgaard, Note, Balancing the Interests of Researchers and Donors in the Commercial Scientific Research
Marketplace, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1473, 1499–1500 (2009); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Cost Needs to Be Part of
the Medical Informed Consent Process, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 8, 2015, 12:45 PM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/elizabeth-glass-geltman/cost-needs-to-be-part-of-the-medical-informed-consent-process_b
_8742926.html (urging providers to practice financial informed consent).
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prevail in a tort action alleging lack of financial informed consent, in part
because of the requirement of proving causation.318 If patients are unlikely to
sue using this cause of action or unlikely to prevail, providers will, in turn, be
unlikely to change their practices. The contractual cause of action has the
benefit of being easier for patients to win than a tort cause of action.
In general, a contract law solution may hold the most promise because it
requires a price specific to the individual patient, but does not run afoul of gag
clauses between insurers and providers. And it allows for more nuance, only
requiring price when the balancing test suggests it should be included (low
transaction cost, high information asymmetry, and little relational benefit to
leaving it blank), so emergencies and highly uncertain procedures may be
exempted (although one could imagine at least a range could be provided).
Even if the regulatory- and private-sector efforts to improve transparency can
change the status quo, these solutions could be augmented by also employing
the common law penalty default. While the penalty default is not without risk
and may not solve all problems, in an area where legislative action has been
slow and ineffective, contract law provides a promising vehicle for change.
CONCLUSION
Current doctrine that enforces contracts between patients and providers that
lack a price term is out of step with theory. For many areas of health care, it
would not be costly for providers to determine a price ex ante; providers have
much better access to pricing information than patients, and leaving out the
price is unlikely to build relational capital between the parties. Contract law
offers a previously unexplored solution to the price transparency problem in
health care: penalty defaults. If courts were to fill open price terms in patientprovider contracts with a price of $0, it would incentivize providers to put in a
price at the contract execution stage. Given the problems in the legislative and
tort solutions on which lawmakers and policymakers have previously focused,
a contract solution merits further exploration.

318 See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment,
85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 317 (1999) (citations omitted) (describing hurdles to succeeding in cause of action).

